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Venture Bearding
Benjamin P. Edwards†* & Ann C. McGinley**
“Venture bearding,” a term that we coin in this Article, describes
processes of obscuring and covering socially stigmatized identities in
business environments. This Article introduces distinctive identity
performance strategies from the technology, startup, and venture capital
context into the legal literature and discusses what their existence explains
about business environments and capital formation. Venture bearding, as
we use the term, describes behaviors that persons with contextually
stigmatized identities adopt to access social status and capital. In some
instances, women, who are stigmatized in this context, may employ men
as front persons to conceal that the venture is an exclusively womenowned business. Venture bearding is a common, complex, and problematic
strategy and is driven by stigma and bias in the business environment.
The Article focuses on how the current startup, technology, and venture
capital landscape causes persons with stigmatized identities to
strategically conceal facets of their female identities in favor of presenting
masculinized identities to conduct business and raise capital. The Article
charts a continuum of venture bearding practices ranging from techniques
to downplay a founder’s identity to the actual employment of men for the
purpose of deriving economic value from their identities.
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The existence of venture bearding raises critical capital allocation
concerns. While venture bearding strategies may mitigate some capital
allocation biases and benefit some entrepreneurs, employing these
strategies risks reifying discriminatory norms. These norms increase the
cost of capital and inhibit economic growth.
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INTRODUCTION
Predicting who will succeed is an imperfect art, but also,
sometimes, a self-fulfilling prophecy. When venture capitalists
say — and they do say — “We think it’s young white men,
ideally Ivy League dropouts, who are the safest bets,” then
invest only in young white men with Ivy League backgrounds,
of course young white men with Ivy League backgrounds are
the only ones who make money for them. They’re also the
only ones who lose money for them.
—Ellen Pao
THIS IS HOW SEXISM WORKS IN SILICON VALLEY1
The cutoff in investors’ heads is 32 . . . . After 32, they start to
be a little skeptical. . . . I can be tricked by anyone who looks
like Mark Zuckerberg. There was a guy once who we funded
who was terrible. I said: “How could he be bad? He looks like
Zuckerberg!”
—Paul Graham
FOUNDER, Y COMBINATOR2
Penelope Gazin and Kate Dwyer faced a familiar problem.3 Like many
female founders, they discovered that developers, graphic designers, and
other outsiders were often condescending and disrespectful in emails.4

1 Ellen Pao, This Is How Sexism Works in Silicon Valley, CUT (Aug. 21, 2017),
https://www.thecut.com/2017/08/ellen-pao-silicon-valley-sexism-reset-excerpt.html
[hereinafter How Sexism Works].
2 Nathaniel Rich, Silicon Valley’s Start-Up Machine, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/magazine/y-combinator-silicon-valleys-start-upmachine.html?pagewanted=all. After public criticism of this statement, Paul Graham
released a statement indicating that the quotation “was a joke.” Paul Graham, “I Can
Be Tricked by Anyone Who Looks Like Mark Zuckerberg,” PAUL GRAHAM (Nov. 2014),
http://www.paulgraham.com/tricked.html (“People will probably still repeat that
quote, but now if someone does it will be proof that either (a) they didn’t do their
research or (b) they have an ideological axe to grind.”). Regardless of whether the
statement was intended as a joke at the time it was made, it resonates because of the
widespread bias toward allocating capital to particular classes of founders. Ellen Pao
confirms that investors place a great emphasis on finding young male venture
capitalists’ projects in which to invest. See ELLEN K. PAO, RESET: MY FIGHT FOR
INCLUSION AND LASTING CHANGE 66-82 (2017) [hereinafter RESET].
3 John Paul Titlow, These Women Entrepreneurs Created a Fake Male Cofounder to
Dodge Startup Sexism, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/
40456604/these-women-entrepreneurs-created-a-fake-male-cofounder-to-dodge-startupsexism.
4 Id.
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One developer even began an email with “okay girls.”5 Another
attempted to “stealthily delete everything” on their website when Gazin
declined an invitation to go on a date with him.6
To sidestep the constant conflict and secure better treatment, Gazin
and Dwyer presented their business with a masculine identity.7 The
two created an email account for a fictitious third cofounder named
Keith Mann.8 Developers treated Mr. Mann differently than they
treated the female founders. Developers responded to the imaginary
man’s messages more quickly and respectfully.9 While they recognized
the injustice in how they were treated, the female founders embraced
the strategy, accepting that “this is clearly just part of this world that
we’re in right now. We want this and want to make this happen.”10
For all founders, the size, shape, and frequency of the obstacles they
face shifts with perceptions about their identities. Identity alters the
economic landscape because venture capitalists, developers, and
others may consciously and unconsciously modulate their behavior
depending on the perceived identity of the founder.11 In some
instances, identity grants a person access to social or economic
benefits.12 In others, it acts as a friction, increasing transaction costs
and making interactions more difficult.13 Gazin and Dwyer opted to
5

Id.
Id.; see also Hannah-Rose Yee, These Entrepreneurs Made Up a Fake Male Cofounder to Deal with Sexism, N.Y. POST (Aug. 30, 2017, 3:38 PM),
http://nypost.com/2017/08/30/these-entrepreneurs-made-up-a-fake-male-co-founderto-deal-with-sexism/.
7 Titlow, supra note 3.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. (quoting Kate Dwyer).
11 See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF
GOOD PEOPLE 48-52, 111-22 (2013) (explaining that implicit biases held by people as
measured by the Implicit Association Test are related to behavior resulting from those
biases in both the race and gender contexts); Judge Nancy Gertner & Melissa Hart,
Employment Law: Implicit Bias in Employment Litigation, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS
THE LAW 80, 81-86 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (arguing that in
deciding employment discrimination cases federal judges exercise implicit bias, which
harms plaintiffs); Rebecca D. Gill, Implicit Bias in Judicial Performance Evaluations: We
Must Do Better Than This, 35 JUSTICE SYS. J. 301, 306 (2014) (“[E]veryone is exposed
to the societal stereotypes associated with different categories of people. It is through
the lens of these stereotypes that we perceive, process, store, recall, and synthesize
information about people.”).
12 See Nancy Leong, Identity Entrepreneurs, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2016)
(“Each of these individuals is what I will call an identity entrepreneur — someone who
leverages his or her identity as a means of deriving social or economic value.”).
13 Cf. Claire Cain Miller, Google Releases Employee Data, Illustrating Tech’s
6
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present outsiders with a masculine identity because it reduced
transaction costs and allowed them to devote more time and attention
to launching and growing their business.14
Research shows that uncorrected implicit biases pervade the
business environment, tilting the investment decisions made by
venture capitalists toward men.15 Because venture capitalists are
overwhelmingly white and male, they may be particularly vulnerable
to implicit bias in favor of white male founders in evaluating
investment opportunities.16
The digital passing strategy employed by Gazin and Dwyer
exemplifies an instance of what we will call venture bearding. We use
the term to describe the techniques used by women and others in
technology and venture capital firms either to pass for an idealized
masculine identity or to cover their otherwise stigmatized identities
and deflect attention from their differences for the purpose of
accessing social and economic resources.17 In many instances venture
bearding involves the sublimation of a woman’s identity and role
within a business and the elevation of a man’s position. By shifting a
masculine identity into the foreground, a woman may access social
and economic resources that would otherwise be out of reach.

Diversity Challenge, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014, 6:42 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.
com/2014/05/28/google-releases-employee-data-illustrating-techs-diversity-challenge/?_r=0
(“[W]omen who try to start tech companies face exclusion by a venture capital
network dominated by a chummy fraternity of men.”).
14 See Titlow, supra note 3.
15 For more details on these implicit preferences, see infra notes 132–56, and
accompanying text.
16 See Dan Lyons, Jerks and the Start-Ups They Ruin, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Apr. 1,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/opinion/sunday/jerks-and-the-start-upsthey-ruin.html?_r=0 (stating that as of 2014, only “[six] percent” of “investing
partners at venture capital companies were women”); Somini Sengupta, If You’re a
Venture Capitalist, You’re Most Likely a White Man, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Nov. 22, 2011,
10:42 AM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/if-youre-a-venture-capitalistyoure-most-likely-a-white-man/ (reporting that “[eighty-seven] percent identified
themselves as white, [nine] percent were Asian, [two] percent black or Latino, with
the remaining [two] percent calling themselves ‘mixed race.’”).
17 In discussing identities through the lens of commonly accepted categories, the
analysis risks essentializing conceptions of whiteness, nonwhiteness, masculinity, and
femininity. This degree of reduction puts the gradations between and inherent
arbitrariness of identity categories to the side. In many instances, the lines between
white and non-white blur. See, e.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White:
The Legal Construction of Arab American Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29, 33
(2013) (describing how “[George] Shishim became the first immigrant from the Arab
World to be naturalized as an American and judicially ruled white by law”).
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The term venture bearding evocatively encapsulates the presentation
of masculinity. A beard symbolizes masculinity, and as facial hair
increases, men and women rate bearded men as more masculine.18
Men and women in some societies view bearded men as enjoying
higher social status, and men see bearded men as more aggressive.19 In
the United States, in the mid-1990s there emerged a “craze” that
experts say rivals the facial hair movement of the 1960s, a movement
that continues today.20 In colloquial usage, the term “beard” has
referred to women who provide a cloak of heterosexuality for gay and
bisexual men.21 By their presence, these women seemingly confirm a
man’s heterosexual masculinity. Actual beards (or their absence) have
long been used to convey information about a person’s identity.
Historically, Jews and others facing persecution shaved their beards to
avoid stigma.22 Others have grown beards to blend in and pass for
locals in beard-wearing cultures.23 Some grow beards to obscure their
faces and true thoughts.24 As a term, venture bearding aims to convey
18 See Barnaby J. Dixson & Robert C. Brooks, The Role of Facial Hair in Women’s
Perceptions of Men’s Attractiveness, Health, Masculinity and Parenting Abilities, 34
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 236, 240 (2013) (finding that ratings of masculinity rose
with beardedness, and facial hair correlates with ideas of maturity, dominance, and
aggression). See generally CHRISTOPHER OLDSTONE-MOORE, OF BEARDS AND MEN: THE
REVEALING HISTORY OF FACIAL HAIR 1-4 (2015) (describing how beards have been
associated with conceptions of masculinity).
19 See, e.g., Barnaby J. Dixson & Paul L. Vasey, Beards Augment Perceptions of
Men’s Age, Social Status, and Aggressiveness, but Not Attractiveness, 23 BEHAV. ECOLOGY
481, 486 (2012) (“[M]en and women from NZ and Samoa judged neutral faces with
beards as having higher social status” and “[m]en also judged bearded faces posing
angry facial expressions as more aggressive than clean-shaven faces.”).
20 See ALLAN PETERKIN, ONE THOUSAND BEARDS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF FACIAL HAIR
190-91 (2001) (describing the popularity of different types of beards from goatees to
“snail trails”).
21 See Marc A. Fajer, A Better Analogy: “Jews,” “Homosexuals,” and the Inclusion of
Sexual Orientation as a Forbidden Characteristic in Antidiscrimination Laws, 12 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 37, 46 (2001) (“One shared symbol of self-censorship is the ‘beard.’
Jewish men shaved their beards to indicate that they were becoming modernized. Gay
men brought ‘beards’ — women whom they seemed to be dating — to public
functions to suggest that they were heterosexual.”).
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., James Brooke, Vigilance and Memory: Kandahar; Pentagon Tells Troops
in Afghanistan: Shape Up and Dress Right, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/12/us/vigilance-memory-kandahar-pentagon-tellstroops-afghanistan-shape-up-dress-right.html (“For several months, the Special
Operations Forces soldiers whom the United States sent to Afghanistan have been
growing beards and donning local garb in an effort to blend in with the local people
and their surroundings.”).
24 See Alex Williams, What Your Beard Says About You, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2011),
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deflection, concealment, drag, and the projection of an idealized
masculinity.25
Venture bearding may take many forms. In some instances, it occurs
at the intersection of entity formation and identity negotiation. Venture
bearding occurs when: (1) a woman substitutes a man in her place as
the face of an entity to mitigate gender bias; or (2) a woman includes a
man (a tactic we call manclusion) in economic activities because his
masculine presence offers a passport to better treatment. Venture
bearding also occurs through traditional identity performances where
women seek to pass for men in electronically-mediated discourse, or
otherwise take steps to deflect attention from their differences.
The literature contains rich discussions about how persons with
stigmatized identities manage their identity presentation to assimilate,
pass for white, or to cover stigmatized aspects of their identities.26 This
Article expands the academic literature by introducing distinctive
identity performance strategies from the technology, startup, and
venture capital context. It contributes to the legal literature by
discussing what their existence signifies about the business
environment and capital formation.27
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/fashion/what-your-beard-says-about-you-themirror.html (“A beard is a mask as much as a fashion accessory, hiding the ‘you’ that
everyone knows as you and replacing it with whatever they happen to associate with
the phrase ‘guys with beards.’”).
25 See Ridhi Tariyal, To Succeed in Silicon Valley, You Still Have to Act Like a Man,
WASH. POST (July 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/
wp/2018/07/24/to-succeed-in-silicon-valley-you-still-have-to-act-like-a-man/?utm_term=
.bbb801e316a4 (“When women pitch mostly male investors, we essentially do it in drag.
We ‘code’ male. We may no longer wear the shoulder pads of the 1980s but that is because
dress, vernacular and careful selection of cultural touchstones are the superficial
accoutrements of a gendered performance. Women have advanced the art much further.”).
26 In his oft-cited article, Kenji Yoshino drew from the sociological literature and
distinguished between passing and covering. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J.
769, 772 (2002) (“Passing means the underlying identity is not altered, but hidden.
Passing occurs when a lesbian presents herself to the world as straight. Covering
means the underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is downplayed.”). See
generally DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 35-38 (2013) [hereinafter ACTING WHITE?] (discussing the
“working identity” of blacks and the choices that black workers make as to how to
present their identities in a way that is socially acceptable to those in predominantly
white workplaces).
27 A search for the terms “implicit bias” and “venture capital” within the same
sentence returned no results in Westlaw’s secondary source database. Notably, the
Article is also informed by our experiences as a man and a woman who researches and
writes about men. In particular, men do not often write about gender issues. See Corey
Rayburn, Why Are You Taking Gender and the Law?: Deconstructing the Norms That
Keep Men Out of the Law School’s “Pink Ghetto,” 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 71, 74-75
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Part I examines how gender bias distorts capital allocation. That
Part reviews how pervasive gender bias increases capital costs for
founders who do not conform to the idealized young, white, male Ivy
League-dropout norm.28 It examines how these identity-based
preferences stigmatize many persons, especially women, who do not
conform to the idealized norms.29 It details how the business
environment shifts along identity lines, making it substantially more
difficult for many to raise capital.30 For women, this often means that
investors seek to negotiate sexual access to their bodies instead of, or
alongside, a standard term sheet.31 In contrast, young men often
benefit from a social subsidy, favored by explicit and implicit
preferences.32
Part II analyzes identity performance theory and applies it to the
strategies many founders now employ to reduce their cost of capital
and access economic and social resources. For individuals with
stigmatized identities, forced assimilation toward an idealized
masculine identity often occurs in three ways: conversion, passing,
and covering.33 In utilizing digital passing strategies, female founders
may simply remove clear markers of their femininity in electronically
mediated exchanges or operate from behind masculine handles and
sobriquets. These mediated modes of interaction may allow them, for a
(2003) (“For the most part, men are not teaching, writing about, or taking classes that
address gender issues. The numbers are astonishing and if institutional arrangements
remain the same there is little hope for change since the norms against male
involvement are deeply imbedded in the educational environment.”).
28 See Pao, How Sexism Works, supra note 1 (describing the preference for young,
white men that have dropped out of an Ivy League institution).
29 See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2226 n.8 (2013)
[hereinafter Racial Capitalism] (“The intersection of race with other identity
categories, such as gender, class, and sexual orientation, affects the degree of privilege
that any individual white person in fact experiences . . . .”).
30 See, e.g., Jessica Guynn, It’s Called the “Pao Effect” — Asian Women in Tech are
Fighting Deep-Rooted Discrimination, USA TODAY (Sept. 19, 2017, 2:21 PM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/09/19/ellen-pao-asian-women-techglass-ceiling-bamboo-ceiling/665822001/ (describing how one founder “was
approached by an investor at a pitch competition. It was only after the investor lured
her on a business trip to New York that she realized the offer to help her raise money
was a ruse to sleep with her”).
31 See PAO, RESET, supra note 2, at 143 (“I’ve heard too many stories from women
CEOs about their struggles to be treated fairly when asking VCs for funding. They get
talked over, interrupted, ignored, leered at, and propositioned.”).
32 See Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 371-72 (2004)
[hereinafter Masculinities at Work] (explaining how men benefit from a “patriarchal
dividend” allowing them greater access to resources simply because they are male).
33 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 772.
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time, to pass as persons with idealized identities. As a term, venture
bearding also aims to capture how a strong discriminatory animus now
causes outgroup members to perform their identities in ways aimed at
deflecting dominant group member attention from their difference.34
Part III examines legal avenues to address systemic discrimination
and bias. Although existing anti-discrimination laws do not apply to
situations outside of the traditional employer-employee relationship,
the venture capital industry faces strong incentives to address
significant distributive justice concerns as well as the inefficiencies of
the current discriminatory environment.35 Pervasive genderdiscrimination in technology reduces the supply of technology
workers by deterring entry into the field. It also inhibits capital
formation, skews capital allocation, and may generate less useful
innovation and lower returns than an environment that allocates
capital more efficiently.
Although we focus on the American technology and venture capital
context, persons with contextually stigmatized identities will
undoubtedly adopt similar strategies in other business environments.
I.

GENDER BIAS AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION

To showcase how systemic bias affects capital allocation, this Part
reviews how gender bias inhibits women seeking to raise capital. It
shows that gender bias misallocates social resources, causing harm to
all stakeholders and generating less useful development than would
otherwise occur.
A. Gender Bias Exists
When venture capitalists fund business development, they direct
disproportionate amounts toward male entrepreneurs. In 2016, all-male
firms raised $58.2 billion in venture capital funding.36 In contrast, allfemale firms raised only $1.46 billion.37 Although these numbers do not
reveal funding disparities per founder, other research has revealed the
34

See id. (defining covering).
This is particularly true today given the #MeToo movement and the important
repercussions it is having throughout many industries. See Stephanie Zacharek et al.,
The Silence Breakers, TIME (2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017silence-breakers/ (naming the #MeToo women as the magazine’s Person of the Year).
36 Valentina Zarya, Venture Capital’s Funding Gender Gap is Actually Getting Worse,
FORTUNE (Mar. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/13/female-founders-venturecapital/.
37 Id.
35
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stark contrast for individuals seeking capital: “Black-female-founded
start-ups raised an average of $36,000, while the white-male-led startups that failed raised an average of $1.3 million.”38
Several factors may influence the persistent differentials.39 The
pipeline to technology firms plays some role. If fewer women seek
funding or launch technology startups, that differential would affect
relative funding levels. Now, only about eighteen percent of computer
science degrees go to women.40 This number peaked at thirty-seven in
1984. But women have been discouraged by universities and the
industry from pursuing degrees in computer science, and their
percentage has decreased significantly in the past thirty years.41 While
the pipeline is a problem, industry conditions also contribute to
decisions about whether to take or leave jobs in the industry.42 Female
38 Doree Shafrir, How Ingrained is Sexism in Silicon Valley? Ask the Women Trying
to Get Funding, CUT (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/04/womenentrepreneurs-talk-about-sexism-in-silicon-valley.html.
39 A variety of additional factors compound the ones detailed here. This is not an
attempt at an exhaustive list. Rather, the factors highlighted establish that the business
environment in startups, technology, and venture capital now segments along gender
lines, with female entrepreneurs facing higher capital costs because of the
stigmatization of their identities. Moreover, one group of theorists suggests that the
divergence between male and female lending in venture capital occurs because
uncertainty, which is great at the funding stage by venture capitalists, plays a role in
emphasizing the manifestation of bias. See Sarah Thébaud & Amanda J. Sharkey,
Unequal Hard Times: The Influence of the Great Recession on Gender Bias in
Entrepreneurial Financing, 3 SOC. SCI. 1, 24 (2016).
40 Liza Mundy, Why Is Silicon Valley So Awful to Women?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/why-is-silicon-valley-so-awfulto-women/517788/ (“The percentage of female computer- and information-science
majors peaked in 1984, at about 37 percent. It has declined, more or less steadily, ever
since. Today it stands at 18 percent.”).
41 See Emily Chang, Women Once Ruled the Computer World. When Did Silicon Valley
Become Brotopia?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 1, 2018, 1:00 AM PST),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-02-01/women-once-ruled-computerswhen-did-the-valley-become-brotopia [hereinafter Women Once Ruled].
42 Women who know they will face constant discrimination in a particular field
may decide to pursue other vocations. See CATHERINE HILL ET AL., AM. ASS’N OF UNIV.
WOMEN, WHY SO FEW? WOMEN IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND
MATHEMATICS 24, 70 (2010), https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Why-So-FewWomen-in-Science-Technology-Engineering-and-Mathematics.pdf (finding that in
STEM careers, women’s sense of isolation, unsupportive work environments, extreme
work schedules and unclear rules concerning advancement are major factors in
women’s decisions to leave the organization); Isis H. Settles et al., Derogation,
Discrimination, and (Dis)Satisfaction With Jobs in Science: A Gendered Analysis, 37
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 179, 181, 185 (2012) (stating that perceptions of both men and
women that the organization is sexist leads to lower job satisfaction and that even
when perceptions are inaccurate, workers make decisions about involvement and
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entrepreneurs receive significantly less venture capital in large part
because of the rhetoric about gender stereotypes that accompanies
funding decisions.43 Consider the general hostility expressed by one
former financial sector employee turned technology firm founder who
characterized Silicon Valley’s women as:
[S]oft and weak, cosseted and naïve despite their claims of
worldliness, and generally full of shit. They have their selfregarding entitlement feminism, and ceaselessly vaunt their
independence, but the reality is, come the epidemic plague or
foreign invasion, they’d become precisely the sort of useless
baggage you’d trade for a box of shotgun shells or a jerry can
of diesel.44
This is not an isolated sentiment. Young men in high tech and
engineering firms voice and demonstrate hostility towards their
female colleagues.45 This type of behavior also occurs in venture
commitment and even leave organizations based on perceptions of sexism). Women
are perceived as incompetent in STEM jobs, but if competent, they are often perceived
to be unlikeable. Women who are competent must demonstrate themselves as more
communal in order to be liked than men, but there is a double edge sword because if a
woman tries to be too communal, she will be perceived to be incompetent. See HILL ET
AL., supra, at 86.
43 Malin Malmstrom et al., Gender Stereotypes and Venture Support Decisions: How
Government Venture Capitalists Socially Construct Entrepreneurs’ Potential, 41
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 833, 847 (2017) (finding that government venture
capitalists used stereotypical language about both men and women when discussing
whether to fund their projects: men were described as agentic, innovative, credible,
trustworthy, very competent, experienced, and knowledgeable, whereas women were
described as needing support, of questionable credibility, lacking in competence, and
having questionable experience and knowledge).
44 ANTONIO GARCÌA MARTÌNEZ, CHAOS MONKEYS: OBSCENE FORTUNE AND RANDOM
FAILURE IN SILICON VALLEY 57 (2016).
45 SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT ET AL., THE ATHENA FACTOR: REVERSING THE BRAIN DRAIN IN
SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY 7-11 (2008) [hereinafter THE ATHENA
FACTOR] (detailing extremely hostile, predatory behavior toward women in Science,
Education, and Technology (“SET”) jobs, including isolation, sexually explicit taunts,
attitudes that women are less competent, and “geek” culture refusal to acknowledge
women in their presence or mistaking women for administrative assistants). In an
updated study, the same authors found less hostile behavior, and a continuing rich
pipeline of qualified women; women were discouraged, however, with twenty-seven
percent believing their careers were stalled, thirty-two percent saying they were likely
to quit within a year, and forty-six percent concluding that men in senior management
saw men as “leadership material” more readily than women. See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT
ET AL., CENTER FOR TALENT INNOVATION, ATHENA FACTOR 2.0: ACCELERATING FEMALE
TALENT IN SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2014),
http://www.talentinnovation.org/assets/Athena-2-ExecSummFINAL-CTI.pdf.
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firms.46 One young woman at a leading technology firm states, “It
reminds me of the antelope and lion footage you see in nature films.
The culture is extremely predatory, and the women are the prey.”47 In
a study of engineering and technology firms, more than one quarter of
the women studied complained that their male colleagues consider
them to be less capable and “genetically disadvantaged.”48
However, the masculine dominance of technology firms was not
inevitable. In fact, a recent book by Emily Chang demonstrates that
women predominated among the first computer programmers and
were drummed out of tech businesses because of the ill-conceived
notion that the best programmers were anti-social.49 Since those early
days, women have received the message that they are not welcome
through a failure of recruiting or mentoring or downright
discrimination, and the move to hire male “nerds” as computer
programmers. 50
Moreover, the environments in tech, engineering, and venture firms
are disproportionately masculine: they value extremely long work
hours and offer little space between personal life and work life. Long
work hours, complete dedication to pursuit of work, and the ability to
work 24/7 are characteristics of workplaces that are identified as
masculine, prestigious, upper middle class, and white.51 In fact,
workplaces with these qualities allow men to perform and enhance
46 See, e.g., PAO, RESET, supra note 2, at 121-45 (describing her treatment in the
industry and her lawsuit for sex discrimination); Katie Benner, Women in Tech Speak
Frankly on Culture of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speak-out-sexual-harassment.html
(describing sexual harassment of women in the tech industry); Silicon Valley’s Sexism
Problem, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/
21720621-venture-capitalists-are-bright-clannish-and-almost-exclusively-male-siliconvalleys-sexism (noting that tech in general and Silicon Valley in particular have a
gender problem with women representing only twenty-one percent of American tech
executives, sixty percent of women stating in one study that they had experienced
unwanted sexual advances, and two-thirds feeling excluded from social and
networking opportunities).
47 See HEWLETT ET AL., THE ATHENA FACTOR, supra note 45, at 9.
48 Id. at 10.
49 See Chang, Women Once Ruled, supra note 41.
50 See id.
51 See Richard Collier, Naming Men as Men in Corporate Legal Practice: Gender and
the Idea of “Virtually 24/7 Commitment” in Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2387, 2403-06
(2015) (describing the big corporate law firm and the contradiction of the masculine
environment that feeds men’s sense of identity and the firms’ professed interest in
wellbeing); Ann C. McGinley, Masculine Law Firms, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 423, 43032 (2013) (describing contemporary law firms that value hard work, no flexibility,
and make it virtually impossible for men to spend much time with their children).
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their masculinity in the eyes of their co-workers, supervisors, and
clients. Perhaps more importantly, these environments allow men to
feel that their work is important and that they are engaged in an elite
enterprise.52 Therefore, there is little incentive to accommodate the
schedules of women, or men who are engaged in the “feminine” task
of care giving. In fact, studies demonstrate that there is a gender
stereotype bias against workers who take advantage of flexible work
policies or caregiving leave.53
In essence, the importance of presence and visibility for long hours
during workdays and on weekends creates pressure on workers with
family responsibilities. Men tend to prove their masculinity through
their relationships to work, and these environments reproduce
themselves, but women often have greater family responsibilities.
Because women tend to bear a disproportionate share of familial
responsibilities, their ability to make the career-maximizing decision
at every opportunity is often limited.54 Moreover, research
demonstrates that women who are mothers benefit from more flexible
schedules, which are difficult to find in these masculine workplaces.55
Although this dynamic plays a role, other factors, including bias,

52 See, e.g., Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender
Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2245, 2271-72 (2010) (describing a new “hypercompetitive ideology” in law firms
that sees working 24/7 as heroic, identifies particular firms as elite, and thus creates
no incentive for firms to shorten work days or to refuse to deliver service to clients
on-demand).
53 See Stephanie Bornstein, The Legal and Policy Implications of the “Flexibility
Stigma,” 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 389, 390-91 (2013).
54 See Deborah L. Rhode, Leadership in Law, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1603, 1647 (2017)
(reporting the view that “[b]ecause of their disproportionate family responsibilities,
female attorneys are reportedly more likely to reduce their schedules, take time out of
the workforce, and lack the credentials that could propel them into leadership
positions”); see also McGinley, Masculinities at Work, supra note 32, at 363 (“While
many women ‘choose’ to forego careers to spend time with their children, these
‘choices’ are often ordered by necessity, societal expectations, and lack of
opportunities.”); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for
Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 77,
90-101 (2003) (discussing the relatively new area of family caregivers’ discrimination
claims, which rely on a number of potential statutory violations, and describing the
difficulty that mothers often have in workplaces where working very long hours is
expected, as well as the stereotypes applied to mothers and how they affect their
working conditions).
55 See Ann C. McGinley, Gender, Law, and Culture in the Legal Workplace: A
Chilean Case Study, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 744-46 (2018) [hereinafter Gender, Law, and
Culture] (discussing the pleas for flexibility from mothers who are lawyers who were
interviewed as part of an empirical study of gender and lawyers).
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stereotypes, and workplace cultures also play a significant role,
deterring and harming even those women without disproportionate
family responsibilities.56
1.

Pay Differentials

For a variety of reasons, the American business environment has
long returned richer rewards to men, making it more difficult for
women to accumulate the capital reserves to launch businesses. One
recent review found that as of 2015 working women were typically
paid only “80 percent of what men were paid, a gap of twenty
percent.”57 The gap grows significantly wider “for Hispanic and Latina
women, who earned only 54 percent of what white men were paid in
2015.”58 African-American women made only sixty-three percent of
what white men were paid.59 Although income increases with
education levels, the gender pay gap remains and sometimes widens at
higher levels of academic achievement.60 Women are also
underrepresented in the ranks of senior executives, holding only
twenty-five percent of these positions as of 2015.61 The pay gap
reflects not only differential pay for women who have family
responsibilities, but also a differential that cannot be explained by
pregnancy, childcare, or other factors.
The pay gap remains for women in technology. Consider the income
differential between men and women in software development, a
traditionally male-dominated field.62 As of 2015, the median male
software developer earned $1,751 a week.63 The median female

56 See Madeline E. Heilman, Gender Stereotypes and Workplace Bias, 32 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 113, 123-28 (2012); McGinley, Gender, Law, and Culture, supra
note 55, at 738; JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., THE CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, CLIMATE CONTROL:
GENDER AND RACIAL BIAS IN ENGINEERING? 4-10 (2016), http://worklifelaw.org/
publications/Climate-Control-Gender-And-Racial-Bias-In-Engineering.pdf (last visited
Jan. 26, 2018).
57 AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 4
(2017),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.sidnet.org/resource/resmgr/DI_Tool_Kit/The_
simple_truth_about_the_g.pdf [hereinafter THE SIMPLE TRUTH].
58 Id. at 11.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 14. (“At every level of academic achievement, women’s median
earnings are less than men’s median earnings . . . .”).
61 See id. at 20.
62 See id. at 18.
63 See id.
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software developer made only $1,415 a week, eighty-one percent of
the median male earning.64
Gender pay and status disparities may persist even in leading
technology firms. An employee-led review found that Google pays its
female employees less than their male colleagues “at most job levels
within Google, and the pay disparity extends as women climb the
corporate ladder.”65 The review found that women across all job levels
tended to receive lower annual compensation and lower bonuses.66
Google issued a statement in response to the compiled salary data,
saying that its own analysis indicated that its women make “99.7 cents
for every dollar a man makes, accounting for factors like location,
tenure, job role, level and performance.”67 Nonetheless, Google’s own
diversity report indicates that women comprise a little under a third of
its employees and make up about a quarter of its leadership
positions.68 And, three female employees recently filed suit alleging
pay discrimination.69 Other tech companies also appear to pay women
significantly less than their male employees.70

64

See id.
Daisuke Wakabayashi, At Google, Employee-Led Effort Finds Men Are Paid More
than Women, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/
technology/google-salaries-gender-disparity.html?_r=0.
66 See id.
67 Id. Google also pointed out that the spreadsheet “does not take into account a
number of factors, like where employees are based, whether they are in higher-paying
technical positions, and job performance.” Id. Technical positions receive a pay
premium at similar job levels. See id.
68 See DANIELLE BROWN, GOOGLE DIVERSITY ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 21-22 (2018),
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/diversity.google/en//static/pdf/Google_
Diversity_annual_report_2018.pdf.
69 See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Sued by 3 Female Ex-Employees Who Say It
Pays Women Less than Men, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/09/14/technology/google-gender-pay-lawsuit.html.
70 See
The Gender Pay Gap in Tech, COMPARABLY (June 13, 2016),
https://www.comparably.com/blog/the-gender-pay-gap-in-tech/; The State of Wage
Inequality in the Workplace, HIRED, https://hired.com/wage-inequality-report (last
visited Dec. 26, 2018); Elizabeth Weise, Oracle Is Yet Another Tech Firm Hit with Suit
for Allegedly Paying Women Less than Men, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2017, 7:57 PM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/29/oracle-yet-another-tech-firm-hitsuit-allegedly-paying-women-less-than-men/718471001/. The Department of Labor
also filed a complaint against Oracle for gender pay discrimination. See generally
Complaint Charging Oracle Am., Inc., No. R00192699, (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/newsroom/newsreleases/OFCCP20170071.pdf.
65
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Explicit Preferences for Men

Female founders may face particular challenges in securing capital
because of explicit preferences for men at two different junctures. A
significant subset of the financial sector believes that investment
decisions should be made by men and that wiser investments in the
venture capital space will be in men.
a.

Explicit Preferences for Men to Make Investment Decisions

Much of the capital in venture capital comes from other parts of the
financial sector. Preferences of hedge fund managers shape the flow of
hedge fund capital to venture capital funds because hedge funds direct
significant amounts of capital to venture capital firms.71
Venture capital funds may be overwhelmingly male dominated
because male hedge fund managers may have more confidence in
other male investors. For example, one leading hedge fund manager
expressed concern about whether mothers would make smart
investment decisions.72 Paul Tudor Jones founded Tudor Investment
Corporation, one of the world’s largest and most profitable hedge
funds.73 At one talk, he claimed that motherhood interferes with
investment prowess, saying that:
As soon as that baby’s lips touch that girl’s bosom, forget
it. . . . Every single investment idea, every desire to understand
what’s going to make this go up or go down, is going to be
overwhelmed by the most beautiful experience, which a man
will never share, about a mode of connection between that
mother and that baby.74
71 See Alexandra Stevenson, Hedge Funds Are the New Venture Firms, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/hedge-fundsare-the-new-venture-firms.html (“In Silicon Valley, hedge funds with billion-dollar
reserves are becoming the new venture capitalists.”).
72 See ROTHSTEIN KASS INST., WOMEN IN ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: A MARATHON,
NOT A SPRINT 6 (2013), http://txwsw.com/wp-content/uploads/RKWomeninAlternative
Investments1.14F.pdf.
73 Cf. Rob Copeland, Paul Tudor Jones’ New Hedge Fund Pitch: Low, Low Prices,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2017, 6:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/paul-tudor-jonesnew-hedge-fund-pitch-low-low-prices-1488214739 (“Paul Tudor Jones for years
charged some of the highest fees in the hedge-fund industry. Now the billionaire is
cutting them for the second time in eight months . . . . The former cotton trader rose
to fame with a big score during 1987’s stock-market crash.”).
74 William Alden, When a Billionaire Speaks Off the Cuff on Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES
(May 24, 2013, 10:44 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/when-abillionaire-speaks-off-the-cuff/. Jones was also pessimistic about the ability of male
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Reactions to the comments were mixed. Despite the graphic
depiction of breastfeeding and the use of the term “girl” for a female
trader, one commentator characterized Jones remarks as directed at “a
social, structural issue having to do with gender and expectation,”
explaining that Jones really meant that women faced larger burdens
than men.75 Others characterized the comments as both “scientifically
unsound” and as reflecting “what a lot of men on Wall Street actually
think.”76
Many persons share the erroneous perception that men, on average,
make better investors. One survey found that only nine percent of
women surveyed believed that women make better investors than
men.77
However, the data does not support this lack of confidence in
women as investors. For retail investors, women tend to have higher
savings rates and higher rates of return than male investors.78 Women
who manage hedge funds also tend to deliver equivalent or higher
returns than their male competitors.79 One performance review found
that female hedge fund managers returned six percent over a six and a
half year period, outperforming the S&P 500 (4.2%) and a broader
hedge fund index (-1.1%) over the same period.80
Recent research indicates that female investor outperformance may
occur because female investors react differently to stress when
selecting shorter-term investments. One study found that male trading

managers to earn solid returns while going through a divorce; see id.
75 Linette Lopez, I’m a Woman, And I Don’t Think Paul Tudor Jones’ Comments on
Woman Traders Were Sexist, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2013, 4:20 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/paul-tudor-jones-not-sexist-2013-5 (“His point is
that women are expected to get married, expected to have children, and expected to
keep a house . . . there will not be as many women who choose to live the grueling
lifestyle of being a trader and a mother at the same time . . . .”).
76 Alden, supra note 74 (quoting Simone Foxman and Joanna Coles, respectively).
77 See Fidelity Investments, Who’s the Better Investor: Men or Women?, FIDELITY
(May 18, 2017), https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/individual-investing/betterinvestor-men-or-women.
78 See id. (“[A] growing body of evidence, including an analysis of more than eight
million clients from Fidelity, shows that women actually tend to outperform men
when it comes to generating a return on their investments.”).
79 See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN KASS INST., supra note 72, at 2; cf. Rajesh K. Aggarwal &
Nicole M. Boyson, The Performance of Female Hedge Fund Managers, 29 REV. FIN.
ECON. 23, 25 (2016) (finding that women and men perform about the same as hedge
fund managers but that only the best women survive possibly because “investors are
unwilling (for whatever reason) to invest with female hedge fund managers”).
80 See ROTHSTEIN KASS INST., supra note 72, at 2.
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activity increased as male cortisol levels increased.81 In contrast,
female traders did not react as strongly to increasing cortisol levels.82
Another study found that women make steadier investors, trading
significantly less than men and earning higher returns.83 Psychologists
find that men tend to be overconfident about their actual prowess in
financial areas.84
b.

Explicit Beliefs About Male Superiority

Women also face additional challenges because of widespread beliefs
that men are more biologically and socially suited to technology
careers and leadership positions. In a widely-circulated memorandum,
James Damore, then-engineer at Google, wrote about his concerns
with diversity initiatives.85 He stated that “the distribution of
preferences and abilities of men and women differ in part due to
biological causes and that these differences may explain why we don’t
see equal representation of women in tech and leadership.”86 His
memorandum reported that he had received “many personal messages
from fellow Googlers expressing their gratitude” for stating positions
81 See Carlos Cueva et al., Cortisol and Testosterone Increase Financial Risk Taking
and May Destabilize Markets, NATURE (July 2, 2015), https://www.nature.com/
articles/srep11206 (“Cortisol was strongly associated with greater trading activity in
men . . . .”).
82 See id. (“In contrast to the behavior of men in the experiment, women exhibited
a borderline significant negative correlation between trading activity and
cortisol . . . .”).
83 See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender,
Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 262 (2001)
(“While both men and women reduce their net returns through trading, men do so by
0.94 percentage points more a year than do women.”).
84 See id. (“Psychologists find that in areas such as finance men are more
overconfident than women.”). But see Richard T. Bliss & Mark E. Potter, Mutual Fund
Managers: Does Gender Matter?, 8 J. BUS. & ECON. 1 (2002) (finding no evidence that
men are more overconfident or take more risks than women or that there is any
performance difference between men and women). Other studies find differences
based on biological substances. See, e.g., W. V. Harlow & Keith C. Brown,
Understanding and Assessing Financial Risk Tolerance: A Biological Perspective, 46 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 50, 60 (1990) (finding an increase of MAO enzymes in women tend to be
associated with risk-averse behavior); Amos Nadler et al., The Bull of Wall Street:
Experimental Analysis of Testosterone and Asset Trading, 64 MGMT. SCI. 4032 (2018)
(finding a difference between male and female risk-taking based on presence of
increased testosterone, a male hormone).
85 See generally James Damore, Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber: How Bias Clouds
Our Thinking About Diversity and Inclusion, ASSETS (July 2017), https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/3914586/Googles-Ideological-Echo-Chamber.pdf.
86 Id.
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“which they agree with but would never have the courage to say or
defend.”87
The beliefs articulated by Damore may be widely shared within
other technology firms, which are still dominated by men. Damore’s
memorandum found substantial support at Google, and there is no
good reason to believe that its employee population diverges
significantly from that of the remainder of the industry. For example,
Susan Fowler encountered these beliefs when she raised concerns
about the lack of female engineers at Uber.88 The female human
resources representative responded “with a story about how
sometimes certain people of certain genders and ethnic backgrounds
were better suited for some jobs than others, so [Fowler] shouldn’t be
surprised by the gender ratios in engineering.”89 These stereotypical
attitudes, if acted upon in workplaces to deny women jobs,
promotions, or equal pay, would create liability under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.90
These beliefs appear driven more by the existing gender
composition and social status of professions than actual differences
between abilities of the different sexes. The history of computing
provides an illustrative example.91 American women were
programmers during World War II and at NASA after the war.92
During World War II, British women primarily “assembled, troubleshot and ran the British Colossus computers, which decrypted coded
messages intercepted from the German army.”93 This “technical work
required significant skill, but it was perceived as less intellectual

87

Id.
See Susan Fowler, Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber, SUSAN
FOWLER (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-onone-very-strange-year-at-uber.
89 Id.
90 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-58 (1989) (declaring
that adverse employment decisions caused by sex stereotyping is illegal).
91 See Claire Cain Miller, Tech’s Damaging Myth of the Loner Genius Nerd, N.Y.
TIMES, (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/upshot/techs-damagingmyth-of-the-loner-genius-nerd.html [hereinafter Tech’s Damaging Myth] (“Computer
programming was originally considered a woman’s job.”).
92 See id. (explaining that American women “were programmers of the Eniac
during World War II and at NASA”).
93 Marie Hicks, Memo to the Google Memo Writer: Women Were Foundational to the
Field of Computing, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/memo-to-the-google-memo-writer-women-were-foundational-to-thefield-of-computing/2017/08/09/76da1886-7d0e-11e7-a669-b400c5c7e1cc_story.html?
utm_term=.8cae3f665171.
88
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because women did it.”94 As computing grew more important, women
were systematically excluded through the 1950s because the tasks
seemed to be “too important to leave to women.”95
Other professions experience declines in their pay and relative
prestige as the gender balance of the profession shifts. Historically, a
perception that an occupation had become a “woman’s profession”
would diminish the occupation’s compensation and social prestige.96
This happened for secretaries and teachers.97 An influx of women
drove men to “flee, and all of the prestige [drained] out of the job.”98
This has been labeled as the “typewriter paradox: [women] master a
machine or set of skills that opens up job opportunities for them, and
then that job becomes immediately devalued.”99
This dynamic may already be occurring within different segments of
engineering work. A distinction has emerged between front-end and
back-end engineers.100 More women work in the lower paid front-end
engineering area, which focuses on the user interface.101 In contrast,
more men work in back-end engineering that concentrates on systems
that function outside of the user’s view.102 Persons who have done
both front-end and back-end work do not see significant differences in
the work’s difficulty.103
Beliefs about male superiority likely shape investing behavior.
Beliefs that biology and socialization make men better suited for
technology careers and leadership lead to allocating more capital to
technology companies led by men. Ellen Pao revealed that venture
capitalists will sometimes make these beliefs explicit and state that

94 Id. (“Who was performing the tasks, not the content of the work, defined its
worth.”).
95 Id.
96 HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 119 (2012).
97 See id.
98 Id.
99 Id. (crediting Columbia University labor historian Alice Kessler-Harris with
coining the term).
100 See Miller, Tech’s Damaging Myth, supra note 91 (“One example is the
distinction between front-end engineers, who build the parts of a product that users
interact with, and back-end engineers, who work on behind-the-scenes systems, like
data storage or scaling.”).
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id. The women suing Google for pay discrimination alleged that Google
concentrated men in the back-end and women in the front-end engineering jobs. See
Wakabayashi, supra note 69.
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they “think it’s young white men, ideally Ivy League dropouts, who
are the safest bets.”104
3.

Systemic Problems in Workplace Cultures

Women often encounter problems in male-dominated work
environments.105 In many ways, the current venture capital and Silicon
Valley work environments resemble the misogynistic Wall Street
cultures that were revealed in the 1980s.106 Women in the technology
sector and the venture capital industry often encounter sexual
harassment and misogynistic social and workplace cultures
proliferate.107 These toxic masculine cultures make founding new
ventures more difficult and also complicate women’s employment in
the sector, reducing opportunities for women to acquire experience
before launching a venture.108 Sex segregation leads to discrimination
and harassment based on sex.109 And, work environments that are
predominantly male tend to exhibit exaggerated forms of toxic
masculinity. Men police the boundaries of the workplace in order to
confirm their own masculinity to themselves and to the group, and

104

Pao, How Sexism Works, supra note 1 (quoting unnamed VCs); see also HEWLETT
supra note 45, at 9-10.
105 See McGinley, Masculinities at Work, supra note 32, at 409 (“[E]xperience
shows that men in predominately male work environments often denigrate women
and other males who do not conform to gender norms, using gender specific language
that equates inferiority with being female or feminine.”).
106 For detailed descriptions of sexual harassment in Wall Street firms in the 1980s,
see generally SUSAN ANTILLA, TALES FROM THE BOOM-BOOM ROOM: THE LANDMARK LEGAL
BATTLES THAT EXPOSED WALL STREET’S SHOCKING CULTURE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
(2003).
107 See PAO, RESET, supra note 2, at 182-83 (reporting how one female cofounder
received “horrendously sexist, racist, and otherwise inappropriate comments”); Katie
Benner, Women in Tech Speak Frankly on Culture of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speakout-sexual-harassment.html?hpw&rref=technology&action=click&pgtype=Homepage
&module=well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well (“[S]exual harassment
in the tech start-up ecosystem goes beyond one firm and is pervasive and ingrained.”).
108 See CATHERINE ASHCRAFT & SARAH BLITHE, NAT’L CTR. FOR WOMEN IN TECH.,
WOMEN IN IT: THE FACTS 1, 15 (2010), http://www.ncwit.org/sites/default/
files/legacy/pdf/NCWIT_TheFacts_rev2010.pdf (“[F]emale attrition is higher in
technology than in science and in engineering, but across all three climates, it is
considerably higher than men’s attrition.”).
109 See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,
1756-61 (1998).
ET AL., THE ATHENA FACTOR,
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harass and discriminate against women interlopers in an attempt to
force them out and establish the work as necessarily masculine.110
Consider the challenges Susan Fowler reported that she faced at
Uber.111 When she began her “first official day” with her new team,
her manager told her that he “was trying to stay out of trouble at
work . . . but he couldn’t help getting in trouble, because he was
looking for women to have sex with.”112 Although she reported the
behavior to human resources immediately, nothing was done because
human resources said it was his “first offense,” and he was perceived
to be a “high performer.”113 Fowler reported that her concerns were
widely shared by other women working at Uber.114
In response to Fowler’s allegations, Uber launched internal
investigations into its culture and alleged misconduct.115 Concerns
about Uber’s workplace environment emerged into public view.116
Women reported that they had been groped at company retreats.117
Leaked audio from internal meetings revealed female engineers calling
for then-CEO Travis Kalanick to recognize “that there is a systemic
problem here.”118 Concerns about Kalanick emerged as well. One
report revealed that in 2014 he had taken employees to sing karaoke at
“an escort bar, where customers may pay for the company of women,
110 See ANN C. MCGINLEY, MASCULINITY AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
THROUGH A DIFFERENT LENS 53 (2016); Schultz, supra note 109, at 1762-71.
111

See Fowler, supra note 88.
Id.
113 Id.
114 See id. (“I began to meet more women engineers in the company. As I got to
know them, and heard their stories, I was surprised that some of them had stories
similar to my own. Some of the women even had stories about reporting the exact
same manager I had reported . . . .”).
115 See Todd C. Frankel, Ex-Uber Engineer Whose Complaint Started Firm’s Internal
Investigation Dismisses Findings as “Optics,” WASH. POST (June 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/06/13/ex-uber-engineerwhose-complaint-started-firms-internal-investigation-dismisses-findings-as-optics/
?utm_term=.37a7024eb92a (“Fowler is widely credited with causing ride-hailing giant
Uber to launch an internal investigation into its workplace culture after her personal
blog post earlier this year detailed her experiences as an Uber engineer.”).
116 See Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s Aggressive, Unrestrained Workplace Culture, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/technology/uberworkplace-culture.html?_r=0.
117 See id. (“One Uber manager groped female co-workers’ breasts at a company
retreat in Las Vegas.”).
118 Priya Anand, Uber Women to CEO Travis Kalanick: We Have A Systemic Problem,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 24, 2017, 1:39 PM ET), https://www.buzzfeed.com/priya/uberwomen-to-ceo-travis-kalanick-we-have-a-systemic-problem?utm_term=.yjEpwBLYzG#
.ya7O3ybWan.
112
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and some members of the party picked out dates for the evening.”119
This behavior is not unusual in predominantly male fields, and female
employees are forced to decide whether they will go along and try to
become one of the boys.120
The internal investigations at Uber resulted in some actions,
including firings121 and a slew of recommendations that were
unanimously adopted by Uber’s board of directors.122 The report
recommended reallocating the portfolio of “responsibilities that Mr.
Kalanick has historically possessed” as well as steps to empower a
“senior leader who is responsible for diversity and inclusion.”123
Uber’s attempts to minimize the reputational damage from the
scandals misfired, seeming to confirm the hostile environment for
women. After Uber’s lone female board member, Arianna Huffington,
told the press that “this is not a systemic problem” at Uber,124 another
board member generated additional commentary with a sexist
remark.125 In a staff meeting organized for the purpose of discussing
the company’s culture, Huffington told attendees that having “one
woman on a board often leads to more women joining a board.”126
Another board member responded that “[a]ctually, what it shows is
that it’s much more likely to be more talking.”127
119 Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-andhimself-to-the-precipice.html.
120 See, e.g., Meredith Lepore, Going to Strip Clubs with My Male Coworkers is Part of My
Career Strategy, GRINDSTONE (Dec. 23, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/
20140707104650/http://www.thegrindstone.com/2011/12/23/career-management/goingto-strip-clubs-with-my-male-coworkers-is-part-of-my-career-strategy-300/ (noting that
women who work with men in financing are faced with supporting or at least ignoring
their colleagues’ violent and aggressive behavior in strip clubs as part of their work).
121 Mike Isaac, Uber Fires 20 Amid Investigation into Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES
(June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/technology/uber-fired.html
[hereinafter Workplace Culture].
122 Mike Isaac, Uber Embraces Major Reforms as Travis Kalanick, the C.E.O., Steps
Away, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/
uber-travis-kalanick-holder-report.html.
123 Holder Recommendations on Uber, N.Y. TIMES: TECH. (June 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/13/technology/document-The-HolderReport-on-Uber.html.
124 Isaac, Workplace Culture, supra note 121.
125 Mike Isaac & Susan Chira, David Bonderman Resigns from Uber Board After
Sexist Remark, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/
technology/uber-sexual-harassment-huffington-bonderman.html.
126 Id.
127 Id. (quoting David Bonderman). This misogynist response apparently reflects
the “Bernie Bros.” mentality of Silicon Valley. See, e.g., Thrity Umrigar, Bernie Bros
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Although Fowler and others brought attention to Uber’s work
environment, challenges persist throughout the technology space. At
Social Finance (“SoFi”), a startup with a four billion valuation, CEO
Mike Cagney “bragged about his sexual conquests and the size of his
genitalia.”128 SoFi’s chief financial officer would talk “openly about
women’s breasts and once offered female employees bonuses for losing
weight.”129
Survey data confirms that these cultures are common. One survey
found that sixty percent of women in the tech industry had received
unwanted sexual advances in the workplace.130 Most of these
unwanted sexual advances came from superiors, with many
respondents reporting persistent advances from the same superiors.131
These workplace dynamics make it difficult for women to remain in
the industry.
4.

Implicit Bias

In addition to the other factors identified, implicit bias against
female founders likely plays a significant role in raising the cost of
raising capital for women. Unlike purposeful discrimination, implicit
bias occurs as a product of automatic mental associations and
processes.132 A convincing body of social science research
demonstrates that implicit expectations affect how persons absorb new
information.133 Stereotypes play a significant role in human cognition
Made Me Finally Recognize Misogyny in America, HUFFPOST (May 5, 2016, 9:11 AM
ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/thrity-umrigar/bernie-bros-sexism_b_9847092
.html (describing recognition of sexism).
128 Nathaniel Popper & Katie Benner, “It Was a Frat House”: Inside the Sex Scandal
That Toppled SoFi’s C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES: TECH. (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/09/12/technology/sofi-chief-executive-toxic-workplace.html.
129 Id. The same CFO also reportedly said that “women would be happier as
homemakers” than working at technology firms. Id.
130 ELEPHANT IN THE VALLEY, https://www.elephantinthevalley.com (last visited Dec.
20, 2018).
131 Id.
132 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Symposium on Behavioral
Realism: Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (“This
Article introduces implicit bias — an aspect of the new science of unconscious mental
processes that has substantial bearing on discrimination law.”).
133 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1186-92 (1995); Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 484 (2005) (“Studies have demonstrated
that, once people have developed stereotypic expectancies, they ‘remember’
stereotype-consistent behavior that did not actually occur; more-over, stereotype-
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and tend to influence decisions — even for individuals who genuinely
believe that they make decisions as impartial umpires on a case-bycase basis without stereotyping others.134
The largely white male venture capital population may be
particularly vulnerable to implicit bias in decision-making for a variety
of reasons.135 A lack of awareness or concern about widespread
discrimination may lead white male venture capitalists to underinvest
in precautions to prevent their own implicit biases from skewing
investment decisions.136 When these biases affect capital allocation
decisions, venture capitalists may not succeed at selecting the most
profitable investment opportunities. One survey found that white male
venture capitalists and founders were significantly less aware “of
sexism and racism within the tech industry.”137 They also reported
significantly different experiences when seeking to raise capital, with
most women reporting encountering sexism and only eight percent of
men reporting any observation of sexism in the capital raising
process.138

inconsistent behavior that did occur is stored in a more diffuse manner and is thus
less readily retrievable by the decision-maker.”).
134 See Rebecca D. Gill et al., Are Judicial Performance Evaluations Fair to Women
and Minorities? A Cautionary Tale from Clark County, Nevada, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 731,
737 (2011) (“Within the discipline of psychology there has been extensive research
establishing that stereotyping, as part of the normal unconscious cognitive processes
of categorization, leads to inaccurate and unfair judgments of women and
minorities . . . .”); Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t)
Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 886-87 (2016) (“Because of the role of stereotyping in
human cognition, it may be impossible for decisionmakers not to engage their
negative perceptions related to health status. The result is that even individuals who
sincerely believe that they are acting without bias may still be making decisions based
on stereotypes.”).
135 See Lyons, supra note 16 (stating that as of 2014, only “6 percent” of “investing
partners at venture capital companies were women”); Sengupta, supra note 16
(reporting that “87 percent identified themselves as white, 9 percent were Asian, 2
percent black or Latino, with the remaining 2 percent calling themselves ‘mixed
race’”).
136 See Caroline Fairchild, Investors and Startup Founders Think Tech’s Diversity
Problem Will Solve Itself, LINKEDIN (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/startup-founders-investors-think-techs-diversity-solve-fairchild (“More than half
of investors ranked founder commitment to a diverse team as the least of their
concerns when considering to invest.”).
137 Id. (“Nearly 80% of female investors have witnessed episodes of sexism in the
industry (conscious or unconscious), whereas only 28% of male investors reported
witnessing episodes of sexism in the industry.”).
138 Id. (“A majority of female founders said they have witnessed sexism while
trying to raise capital, compared to 80% of male founders.”).
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Bias may manifest in different ways. One study found that venture
capitalists ask different questions of male and female founders.139 The
venture capitalists “tended to ask men questions about the potential
for gains and women about the potential for losses.”140 The researchers
found that the bias in question style extended to both male and female
venture capitalists.141
Implicit biases may play a particularly large role in venture capital
investments because early-stage firms often have short track records
and do not provide much data for analysis. In this environment,
research has found that investors key off of the limited available “hard
data” and their “perceptions of the founding entrepreneur.”142 Some
early-stage investors rely almost entirely on intuition. One reported
that he did not “care about the business plan . . . as much as I care
about the entrepreneur. My most successful deals have come when I
trust my gut feelings . . . when I trust only what my gut tells me about
the entrepreneur, and filter everything else out.”143 Research shows,
however, that due to stereotypes and implicit biases, the “gut” may fail
in determining which ventures deserve funding.144
Empirical research shows that investor’s guts have strong filters.
These “gut” filters favor men, particularly attractive men.145 One novel
series of studies sought to shed light on whether “the gender
imbalance is due to irrational investor behavior.”146 In one study, the
researchers presented participants with the same pitches, alternating
whether a male or female voice read the pitch scripts.147 Both male and
female participants preferred pitches presented by male voices, with
the male pitch winning 68.33% of the time.148 When the researchers
139 Dana Kanze et al., Male and Female Entrepreneurs Get Asked Different Questions
by VCs — and It Affects How Much Funding They Get, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 27, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/06/male-and-female-entrepreneurs-get-asked-different-questionsby-vcs-and-it-affects-how-much-funding-they-get.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Laura Huang & Jone L. Pearce, Managing the Unknowable: The Effectiveness of
Early-Stage Investor Gut Feel in Entrepreneurial Investment Decisions, 60 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
634, 644 (2015).
143 Id. at 645 (quoting an investor).
144 See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
145 Alison Wood Brooks et al., Investors Prefer Entrepreneurial Ventures Pitched by
Attractive Men, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4427, 4427 (2014) [hereinafter Investors
Prefer].
146 Id.
147 Id. at 4428-29.
148 Id. at 4429.
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added photos to the pitches, participants were “significantly more
likely to invest after watching the high-attractiveness male’s pitch.”149
Collectively, the researcher’s studies found “a profound and consistent
gender gap in entrepreneur persuasiveness.”150 Another study
concludes that venture capital is influenced by tangible education and
work history credentials, in tandem with cultural beliefs about gender.
There are two distinct aspects of venture capitalists’ evaluations:
evaluations of the venture and those of the entrepreneur. When
evaluating the entrepreneur, venture capitalists valued the technical
degree for women much more than for men, largely because in hightech entrepreneurship cultures, hegemonic forms of masculinity are
strongly associated with masculinity and technological prowess and
power. Women who lacked documentation of technical expertise
through an educational degree were deemed to be less compatible to
assume leadership roles in technological companies than men with the
same qualifications.151 Interestingly, women with technical
backgrounds and men with non-technical backgrounds appeared to
have an advantage in leadership and sociability ratings over their
same-gender counterparts.152 Moreover, for women, the study found, a
trusted social tie to the evaluator is more important to the evaluation
than for male founders.153
149

Id.
Id. (“Both professional investors and nonprofessional evaluators preferred
pitches presented by male entrepreneurs compared with pitches made by female
entrepreneurs, even when the content of the pitch was the same.”). This study is
consistent with numerous studies of hiring discrimination in which equal resumes are
given men’s and women’s names or names of black applicants and white applicants.
The studies consistently demonstrate a preference for the white male applicants. See,
e.g., Sonia K. Kang et al, Whitened Resumés: Race and Self-Presentation in the Labor
Market, 61 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 469, 491-92 (2016) (finding that black candidates who
removed racial indicators from their resumés received more than a twofold increase in
interviews for jobs); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other
Name?: On Being “Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha
and Jamal Are White, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 1283, 1298-1301 (describing a study in
which resumés with black-sounding names received 50% fewer interview offers);
Alexander W. Watts, Why Does John Get the STEM Job Rather Than Jennifer?, CLAYMAN
INST. FOR GENDER RES. (June 2, 2014), https://gender.stanford.edu/newspublications/gender-news/why-does-john-get-stem-job-rather-jennifer
(describing
research by Corinne Moss-Racusin who found that resumés with male names received
more job offers and at a higher rate of pay than those with female names).
151 See Justine E. Tinkler et al., Gender and Venture Capital Decision-Making: The
Effects of Technical Background and Social Capital on Entrepreneurial Evaluations, 51
SOC. SCI. RES. 1, 11 (2015).
152 Id. at 11-12.
153 Id. at 12.
150
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Anecdotal accounts of venture capital processes cohere with
research findings that investors may misallocate capital toward
attractive men and favor their guts over hard data. For example, Ellen
Pao reported that if “the guy pitching was hyper-confident and used a
lot of technical language, I saw my colleagues take the bait again and
again.”154 She recounts an instance where venture capitalists “were
dead set on pouring more money into” a company led by “a
charismatic Texan with just enough knowledge of tech to be
convincing and more confidence than all our other CEOs
combined.”155 The venture capitalists made the investment without
doing financial due diligence even though two chief financial officers
had recently “quit after short stints on the job, one after just two
weeks.”156
B. Capital Allocation Problems
Systemic gender bias in the capital allocation process drives a host of
problems. Bias in venture capital firms has an outsized impact because
of the amount of capital allocated and the economic activity driven by
venture capital firms. One study found that “public companies with
venture capital backing employ four million people and account for
one-fifth of the market capitalization and forty-four percent of the
research and development spending of U.S. public companies.”157
154

PAO, RESET, supra note 2, at 80.
Id.
156 Id. at 81 (reporting Pao’s “educated guess was that they saw something they
didn’t like in the books and bailed”). New research on court reform efforts in Chile
explains a similar phenomenon. Researchers found that certain “gendered expertise”
and “gendered competence” were perceived to exist, and, based on these perceptions,
court reforms either succeeded or failed. The criminal court reforms that were
identified as masculine and young, high-tech, and different from the “old gentlemen”
lawyers were supported well and found success. In contrast, family court reform, that
was characterized as less scientific and more connected to “feminine” studies such as
psychology received much less legislative support, and it floundered. See María José
Azócar Benavente, Expertos en Derecho: Profesión Legal, Género y Reformas Judiciales en
Chile, 28 REV. DE DERECHO 9, 25-26 (2015) (Chile). These results are examples of
implicit biases that favored men as lawyers (especially young, academic men) and
masculine legal topics, such as criminal law, over women as lawyers and feminine
topics such as family law. The criminal court reform was considered sober and
scientific whereas the family court reform was looked upon as emotional and
unscientific. See Maria Azocar & Myra Marx Ferree, Gender, Lawyers and Professional
Expertise, AM. SOC. ASS’N: WORK IN PROGRESS (Dec. 23, 2015),
https://workinprogress.oowsection.org/2015/12/23/gender-lawyers-and-professionalexpertise-2.
157 Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, The Economic Impact of Venture Capital:
155
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While the investing acumen of venture capitalists plays a role in the
success of venture-backed companies, broader regulatory changes
directing more of society’s capital to venture capital firms also drive
growth. In particular, venture capital firms received massive capital
inflows after pension regulations changed.158 As pension rules relaxed,
capital inflows to venture capital firms increased from a relatively
modest $0.1 billion to “$4.5 billion annually from 1982 to 1987.”159
The capital now gushing into the sector because of these changes
allows venture capital firms to fund an increasing volume of
companies, increasing the total number of successes.
1.

Increased Capital Costs Underutilize Women’s Talents

The cost of capital plays a critical role in business growth and
formation. Lower capital costs allow founders to raise funds more
easily and put more capital to work in their ventures.160 Entrepreneurs
without their own capital acquire capital in the markets by offering
investors a slice of their venture’s equity ownership or by committing
to repay a loan.161 As a general policy preference, policies and norms
that lower capital costs and facilitate capital acquisition lead to
increased economic growth.162
Importantly, the cost of capital to an early-stage entrepreneur
depends not only on the amount of equity she must trade in exchange
Evidence from Public Companies 1 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus. Research
Paper No. 15-55, 2015).
158 Id. at 5.
159 Id.
160 See Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 945 (1993) (“It is a
safe generalization that no nation should increase the cost of raising capital except for
compelling reasons. The lower the cost of capital to a nation’s entrepreneurs, the more
that will be purchased.”).
161 See Kurtis Urien & David Groshoff, An Essay Inquiry: Will the Jobs Act’s
Transformative Regulatory Regime for Equity Offerings Cost Investment Bankers’ Jobs?, 1
TEX. A&M L. REV. 559, 564-67 (2014) (explaining how entrepreneurs can raise capital
either through debt or equity).
162 John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 229, 308 (2007) (“[T]he public (including non-investors) benefits from a
reduced cost of capital.”); Michael Piwowar, Acting Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks Before the 27th International Institute for Securities Market Growth and
Development (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/remarks-27thinternational-institute-securities-market-growth-and-development (“One of the most
important factors in making capital markets work is the cost of capital. If we lower the
cost of capital for business and entrepreneurs, this will lead directly to economic
growth.”).
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for capital but also on the transaction costs associated with making the
deal.163 In the venture capital context, some relevant transaction costs
for raising capital include the costs associated with: (1) preparing a
pitch; (2) getting access to venture capitalists; (3) negotiating deal
terms; and (4) continued negotiations with venture capitalists over
governance, business strategy, and subsequent rounds of capital
raising.164
The cost of capital affects all stakeholders. As transaction costs and
the cost of capital increase, overall economic efficiency declines. This
happens because transaction costs act as a friction in the deal-making
and economic development engine.165 High capital costs undercut real
investment, leading to a reduction in job creation, innovation, and
development.166 In contrast, market developments that reduce
transaction costs and the cost of capital drive economic growth.167
Pervasive gender bias means that female founders face higher and
different capital costs than their male peers. In particular, women
often report a deal-making environment where investors seek to
acquire sexual access to their bodies while negotiating financing
terms.168 Advances may happen even with investors who publicly
163 Cf. Geoffrey Miller, Ethics in Corporate Representation: From Club to Market: The
Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2005) (recognizing
that behavior that increases transaction costs also increases the cost of capital).
164 The term “transaction cost” has been used in different ways in the legal
literature. David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs:
Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 84
(2005) (“In spite of the pervasiveness of the transaction cost minimization goal,
scholars do not share an agreed-upon definition of transaction costs. Usually,
definitions vary with the subject under analysis.”).
165 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Must Salmon Love Meinhard? Agape and Partnership
Fiduciary Duties, 17 GREEN BAG 2d 257, 268-69 (2014) (“Just as friction reduces the
efficiency of a machine, transaction costs are a dead weight loss making transacting
less efficient.”).
166 See Ziven Scott Birdwell, The Key Elements for Developing a Securities Market to
Drive Economic Growth: A Roadmap for Emerging Markets, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
535, 547 (2011) (“If the cost of capital can be decreased, businesses have an incentive
to increase real investment, resulting in more jobs, higher income, and greater
economic growth.”).
167 Id.
168 Jessica Guynn & Jon Swartz, Sexism and Silicon Valley: Women Can’t Raise Cash
and Now We Have One More Reason Why, USA TODAY (July 13, 2017, 6:40 AM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/07/13/there-hasnt-been-female-markzuckerberg-heres-one-more-reason-why/469470001 (“Women have come forward to
describe the sexual advances that come with negotiating financing, jobs and
partnerships — and retaliation, such as an abrupt end to the business conversation if
they rebuff a sexual come-on.”).
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portray themselves as diversity allies. For example, when Melinda
Epler met with a potential investor about funding for a startup
accelerator focused on woman-led companies, he “moved his hand
close to hers, let his knee brush against hers and advised her that male
investors would find her attractive and she should say nothing when
they spoke to her or touched her in inappropriate ways.”169 The
investor also cautioned her against speaking out about the constant
advances because investors would blacklist her and frustrate her plans
to raise capital.170 Epler now “advises women and underrepresented
minorities not to waste their time trying to raise money from venture
capitalists.”171
2.

Reduced Innovation and Diminished Economic Efficiency

Gender bias in venture capital investment processes may generate
suboptimal returns for investors and society. This happens when the
bias of the persons allocating capital skews the allocation of capital
away from more productive uses and toward allocations preferred by
the capital allocators.172 This can happen in different ways. In the
retail investment sector, financial incentives for financial advisers to
recommend particular products creates a bias toward convincing
investors to allocate capital to less profitable ventures that return more
capital to intermediaries than to investors.173 In the venture capital
space, a bias against women as entrepreneurs may mean that profitable
and social-welfare-enhancing innovations become less likely to be
pursued.
Pervasive bias against women reduces the efficiency of capital
allocation processes — causing capital to flow to suboptimal uses.
This may cause underinvestment in businesses and technology serving
markets that white male venture capitalists do not understand. For
example, white male venture capitalists may not have much familiarity
with breast pumps.174 Their lack of experience with the product may
make it more difficult for them to recognize its value.
169

Id.
Id.
171 Id.
172 See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181,
185 (2017) (“[C]onflicts of interest also affect the broader economy by distorting the
ways in which capital flows to fund business opportunities.”).
173 Id. at 192 (“If the equilibrium were different — rewarding more competition on
the merits and the risks instead of efforts to bias financial advisors, these products
would likely attract less capital, freeing it for more productive uses.”).
174 Emily Chang & Ellen Huet, A Smart Breast Pump: Mothers Love It. VCs Don’t,
170
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This is not the only way in which male-dominated capital allocation
processes may undervalue investment opportunities associated with
female leaders. For example, the broader financial industry skews
overwhelmingly male, though less so than the venture capital
subsector.175 Hedge funds, with only about two percent managed by
women, share roughly similar gender ratios with venture capital
funds.176 Despite this, the women that do receive capital in the hedge
fund space tend to outperform their male-led peers by significant
margins.177
Venture capital firms that fail to correct for bias in their capital
allocation processes miss profitable opportunities. Some evidence
indicates that startups with female founders tend to outperform allmale teams. One venture capital firm recently released the results from
ten years of investing data.178 It found that firms “with a female
founder performed 63% better than [its] investments with all-male
founding teams.”179

BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2017, 12:09 PM PDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-09-21/a-smart-breast-pump-mothers-love-it-vcs-don-t [hereinafter A
Smart Breast Pump] (“[G]etting venture funding can be even harder when your
product isn’t one men use.”).
175 See William Alden, Wall Street’s Young Bankers Are Still Mostly White and Male,
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 30, 2014, 11:09 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/wall-streets-young-bankers-are-still-mostlywhite-and-male/?_r=0 (“Wall Street’s gender diversity problem is not confined to the
top executives. Even at the entry level, investment bank employees are
overwhelmingly men.”).
176 See Sam Polk, How Wall Street Bro Talk Keeps Women Down, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINION (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/opinion/sunday/howwall-street-bro-talk-keeps-women-down.html (“Only about 2 percent of hedge fund
managers are women. During my years on Wall Street, I never saw a woman run a
trading or sales desk, which is the first step toward executive management.”).
177 See ROTHSTEIN KASS INST., supra note 72, at 2.
178 FIRST ROUND: 10 YEAR PROJECT, http://10years.firstround.com/ (last visited Sept.
25, 2017).
179 Id.; see also JMG Consulting, LLC & Wyckoff Consulting, LLC, Venture Capital,
Social Capital and the Funding of Women-Led Businesses, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Apr.
2013), https://www.sba.gov/content/venture-capital-social-capital-and-funding-womenled-businesses (finding that venture firms that invested in women-led businesses had
more positive performances than firms that did not); Victor Lipman, Startups with
Female Founders Grow Faster, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2017, 4:20 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/victorlipman/2017/04/19/start-ups-with-female-foundersgrow-faster/#cf6be14513ed.
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A THEORY OF VENTURE BEARDING

The term venture bearding encapsulates the ways in which women
now perform their identities in response to social and economic
preferences for idealized white or Asian male identities in startups,
technology, and venture capital firms. This Part relates venture
bearding to identity performance theory. It details how persons with
stigmatized identities convert, pass, and cover their identities to access
social and economic benefits despite their subordinated status. It
introduces venture bearding as an alternative form of identity
performance at the intersection of entity formation and identity
performance.
A. The Frame: Identity Performance Theory
Identity performance theory provides a frame for analyzing how
gender discrimination in startup, technology, and venture capital firms
forces women to assimilate in ways that reify discriminatory norms.180
As explained above, stigma attaches to persons who differ from the
idealized, masculine identity prized in the technology and venture
capital context.181 A range of scholars have catalogued how members
of lower status groups will “undertake identity mobilizing strategies to
join ‘higher status’ groups by negating characteristics associated with
the ‘low status’ group.”182 Social psychologist Erving Goffman broke
identity-negating strategies into three categories: conversion, passing,
and covering.183 In his scholarship on antidiscrimination, Kenji
Yoshino applied Goffman’s concepts to detail identity negation in the
context of sexual orientation, race, and sex.184 Conversion here refers
to ways in which an individual alters her underlying identity to move
out of the stigmatized group.185 Passing refers to instances where “the
underlying identity is not altered, but hidden.”186 Covering captures
180 See Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 874-76
(2013) (describing identity performance theory).
181 Tariyal, supra note 25 (“Many female entrepreneurs I know play up masculine
traits, and why shouldn’t we? Research shows investors prefer entrepreneurial pitches
presented by men rather than women, even when the content of the pitch is the
same.”).
182 Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Immigrant Passing, 105 KY. L.J. 95, 126-27 (2016)
(presenting research).
183 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 9,
73, 102 (1963).
184 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 772.
185 Id.
186 Id.
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instances where a person downplays her underlying identity and
minimizes its salience so as to make “it easy for others to disattend”
the fact of her identity.187
1.

Conversion

When persons experience strong stigma on account of particular
characteristics, converting or changing that underlying characteristic
may allow them to escape stigma.188 Persons will literally alter their
identities at great personal cost “to blend into the mainstream.”189
Even though many now consider sexual orientation as an immutable
characteristic,190 homosexuals were (and to some extent are still)
subjected to demands to convert to heterosexual orientations.191
Social, legal, and financial pressures from dominant identity
paradigms have driven persons to attempt to convert many identity
characteristics to more socially advantageous characteristics.
Immigrants who converted their names to more “American” versions
experienced greater economic prosperity than those who did not.192
Health insurance fat taxes have mandated that people who are
overweight convert their “fat bodies” into thin bodies to escape
financial penalties.193 Many persons have converted from one faith to
another and gained access to and membership in new communities.194
187

Id.
See id. at 774 (“When discriminatory animus against an identity is particularly
strong, it may require conversion.”).
189 Kim, supra note 182, at 127.
190 See, e.g., Marie-Amélie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding Conversion
Therapy Bans, 68 ALA. L. REV. 793, 843-44 (2017) (“Sexual orientation is immutable
not because of its cause, but because it is both extremely difficult to alter and so
central to a person’s identity that no one should be asked to change that part of
themselves.”).
191 See generally Yoshino, supra note 26, at 784-810 (detailing the history of
attempts to convert homosexuals into heterosexuals).
192 See Costanza Biavaschi et al., The Economic Payoff of Name Americanization 1,
25 (IZA Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 7725, 2013), http://ftp.iza.org/dp7725.pdf
(“We find, in fact, that immigrants who Americanized their names experienced higher
occupation-based earnings growth than those who did not.”).
193 See Rebecca L. Rausch, Health Cover(Age)ing, 90 NEB. L. REV. 920, 923 (2012)
(“To escape the financial penalties, fat people must either follow a weight loss
program, attempting to convert but probably failing, or state that their fatness is
beyond their control, rendering them helpless and victimized.” (footnote omitted)).
194 See Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 765, 775
(2017) (In post-conversion a person “becomes, in theory at least, accepted as an equal
member of the majority faith community. In other words, she has moved from
outsider to member of the majority in-group and has fundamentally altered a hitherto
188
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Passing

Passing strategies allow persons with disfavored identities to pass as
members of the dominant social group by hiding the disfavored
aspects of their identity.195 Passing allows outgroup members to access
the social and economic privilege they would be denied if their true
identities were known.196 For example, lesbians who do not reveal
their orientation may access economic opportunities that would
otherwise be foreclosed.197
Individuals have also used corporate entities to conceal their
identities.198 For example, before the Supreme Court ruled that
covenants forbidding the sale of land to Black purchasers were
unconstitutional,199 Major Joseph B. Johnson, a former slave, used a
corporate entity to buy land with a restrictive covenant.200 Even
though the “corporation [was] composed exclusively of negroes,” 201 a
Virginia court declined to unsettle the purchase, instead treating the
corporation as a distinct legal entity.202
A new dynamic, reverse passing, has also emerged.203 The term
describes “the process by which whites shed their white racial identity

disadvantaged characteristic.”).
195 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 772 (“Passing occurs when a lesbian presents
herself to the world as straight.”).
196 See Khaled A. Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. REV.
282, 289 (2017) [hereinafter Reverse Passing] (“Due to the tangible benefits associated
with whiteness and the negative value associated with nonwhiteness, persons who are
able to racially identity [sic] as white have every incentive to do so in most
contexts.”).
197 See, e.g., Kate Kendell, Race, Same-Sex Marriage, and White Privilege: The
Problem with Civil Rights Analogies, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 136-37 (2005) (“I
got a job in Salt Lake City at what was then the largest firm in the state. There was not
one openly gay attorney . . . . If they had known I was a lesbian I would not have been
hired. This is the way passing privilege works . . . .”).
198 See Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023, 2027
(2006) [hereinafter Incorporating Race] (“The corporation, as a corporate person, a
persona ficta, itself constitutes another mask that allows persons to conceal and
display their identities.”).
199 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (“We hold that in granting
judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have
denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of
the state courts cannot stand.”).
200 See Brooks, Incorporating Race, supra note 198, at 2024.
201 People’s Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 61 S.E. 794, 795 (Va. 1908), aff’d on
reh’g, 63 S.E. 981 (Va. 1909).
202 Id. at 796.
203 See Beydoun & Wilson, Reverse Passing, supra note 196, at 288-89.
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in exchange for a nonwhite racial identity.”204 This new dynamic may
have emerged because of a shifting “valuation scheme within the racial
hierarchy caused in part by modern affirmative action
jurisprudence.”205
3.

Covering

Covering occurs when a person with a stigmatized identity
characteristic minimizes, downplays, and otherwise avoids drawing
attention to that characteristic.206 Yoshino explained that covering
requires “that the individual modulate her conduct to make her
difference easy for those around her to disattend her known
stigmatized trait.”207 People cover in many different ways and whether
a behavior serves to pass or cover depends on what others already
know.208
Khaled Beydoun has described ways in which American Muslims
now cover to avoid stigmatization.209 Immediately after the election of
President Trump, some Muslim women stopped wearing headscarves
to reduce the salience of their religious identities.210 Beydoun explains
that a “Muslim American male that chooses to shave his beard, for fear
of being perceived as an extremist or profiled as a radical . . .
capitulates to the negative stereotypes and stigmas the state ascribes to
specific expressions of Muslim identity.”211 Others may cover by going
by Anglicized names.212
In Acting White? Rethinking Race in “Post-Racial” America, Devon
Carbado and Mitu Gulati describe behavior of African American
workers who perform their racial identities in less threatening ways in
204 Id. at 288. A famous example is of Rachel Dolezal, the former NAACP leader
who passed for Black. See Mary Bowerman, Rachel Dolezal, Former NAACP Leader Who
Claimed to Be Black, Is on Food Stamps, USA TODAY (Feb. 27, 2017, 8:24 AM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/02/27/rachel-dolezal-formernaacp-leader-who-claimed-white-food-stamps/98469292/.
205 Beydoun & Wilson, Reverse Passing, supra note 196, at 289; see also Leong,
Racial Capitalism, supra note 29, at 2153-54 (arguing that a system of racial capitalism
allows white individuals and white institutions to derive social and economic value by
association with nonwhite persons).
206 Kim, supra note 182, at 131 (describing covering).
207 Yoshino, supra note 26, at 837 (emphasis added).
208 See id. at 842 (“The ways in which an individual can cover are so vertiginously
plural that they are difficult to catalogue.”).
209 See Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018).
210 Id. at 2-3.
211 Id. at 14.
212 See, e.g., id. at 55-57.
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order to gain acceptance in majority-white workplaces.213 According to
Carbado and Gulati, although members of all races perform their
identities in the workplace in order to gain the favor of employers,
“race can increase the likelihood that one’s sense of self will be in
conflict with criteria that an institution values, and, correspondingly,
race can increase the pressure one feels to compromise one’s sense of
identity.”214 Racial minorities engage in six different strategies in order
to conform to employer expectations, all of which create discomfort
and conflict for the employee.215 These strategies include: racial
comfort, strategic passing, using prejudice, racial discomfort, selling
out, and buying back.216 These strategies come at a cost to the
individual applicant or employee who has to perform more work than
others in order be successful at work, and must often sacrifice his or
her true identity to comply.217
Women, too, face demands to engage in covering and other
strategies to assure that others accept them in the tech and venture
capital worlds. Yet they also often face contradictory demands to both
downplay and amplify their femininity at the same time. Yoshino
describes this dynamic as the requirement for women to both cover
and to reverse cover — “to signal [their] outgroup status along other
axes.”218 The demands for women to both downplay their difference
and accentuate their femininity forces women “to strike an
Archimedian mean between the poles of being too masculine and
being too feminine.”219 It is a particularly difficult line to walk in the
tech industry. As in other industries, female leaders must prove they
are communal in order to soften their image as unlikeable, but if they
are considered too communal, they run the risk of being seen as
incompetent. In the tech industry, women explain that they must
learn to act like men. They avoid and look down on other women,
knowing that their professional success depends on withstanding
aggressive male behavior.220 But the women’s adoption of male styles
is not always successful: it can backfire. Women who adopt men’s
213

See generally CARBADO & GULATI, ACTING WHITE?, supra note 26, at 1.
Id. at 26.
215 See id.
216 Id. For an explanation of these strategies, see id. at 27-35; see also Ann C.
McGinley, Reconsidering Legal Regulation of Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation, 50 TULSA L.
REV. 341, 343-44 (2015) (reviewing CARBADO & GULATI, ACTING WHITE, supra note 26).
217 See CARBADO & GULATI, ACTING WHITE?, supra note 26, at 35-42.
218 Yoshino, supra note 26, at 906.
219 Id. at 910.
220 See HEWLETT ET AL., supra note 45, at 11.
214
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styles tend to attack other women as “petty” and “emotional,” thereby
destroying the possibility of solidarity that could potentially be found
in women’s networks. And, in the end, it is virtually impossible for a
woman, even one who adopts a male persona, to join the “old boys’
club.”221 Ellen Pao’s story of a woman who played the game but then
ultimately was characterized as not a team player or too aggressive
demonstrates what happens to a woman who is perceived to be too
masculine.222
B. Venture Bearding as Identity Performance
Shifting identity performance to avoid mistreatment and access
social and economic benefits is not a new phenomenon.223 There are
many distinctive things that women and minorities “feel pressured to
do because of negative assumptions about their identities.”224 This
Article draws on this identity performance frame to coin the process as
venture bearding. With venture bearding strategies, women negotiate
and perform not only their own identities but also the identities of
startup firms in order to be successful in their businesses. These
strategies, like those of racial minorities in majority-white workplaces,
are, at a minimum, more work. They also deny the true identities of
the women who employ them, behavior that takes a personal and
psychological toll, and that harms the public because it does not
challenge the stereotypes and assumptions that deny female venture
capitalists equal treatment.225
The existence of these strategies testifies to the greater degree of
opportunity afforded to masculine men. In practice, even ingenious
venture bearding strategies highlight and reproduce the negative
stereotypes ascribed to women’s identities. By yielding to pressures to
perform their entities in particular ways, women leave discriminatory

221

Id.
See, e.g., PAO, RESET, supra note 2, at 207-08.
223 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259, 1262 (2000) (“The basic concepts of signaling and identity performance are
familiar to most . . . . [Because] women and minorities are often likely to perceive
themselves as subject to negative stereotypes, they are also likely to feel the need to do
significant amounts of ‘extra’ identity work to counter those stereotypes.”).
224 Id.
225 See Tariyal, supra note 25 (“[T]here is a critical difference between codeswitching as a form of expression and as a requirement for survival. Women like me
exist in professional and personal ecosystems that devalue not only femaleness, but
also any perceived ‘otherness.’ For us, the demand to perform is constant, and there is
a tax — physical, mental and emotional — associated with maintaining the mask.”).
222
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norms unchallenged. This is not to say that female entrepreneurs and
employees act wrongfully when they cover or otherwise conform to
the dominant paradigm, but rather that they may continue to harm
themselves and others by confirming the belief that men are superior
entrepreneurs. To blame women who engage in covering or passing is
to blame the victim of the industry’s discriminatory attitudes and
behaviors.
The costs of resisting social pressures and unjust gender
expectations may be too great to force onto the shoulders of
individuals seeking access to economic and social resources.226
Women must often consider the interests of other stakeholders when
they decide how to perform their own identities and how to the shape
the identities of their ventures. For business leaders, this may include
duties to existing investors, employees, and others who have a stake in
the success of a business venture. It may also include family
obligations.
1.

Substitution

Identity performance theory predicts that the strength of
discriminatory animus against an identity will drive the responses to
it.227 Particularly hostile environments will drive individuals to
convert their underlying identity characteristics if they are able.228 As
animus diminishes, the diminished pressure may allow persons to pass
or to cover their identities.229
As predicted by identity performance theory, some women attempt
strategies approaching conversion to access capital. In at least one
instance, a female founder strategically converted to a mixed-gender
enterprise to increase her ability to access capital.230 She substituted a
man as the public face of the venture to facilitate her access to capital.
Speaking on the condition of anonymity, a female founder revealed
that she had grown frustrated with pitching groups of all-male venture
capitalists. She perceived that their biases led them to discount both
her and her startup. She believed that if a man were pitching the exact
226 See McGinley, Masculinities at Work, supra note 32, at 375 (“Women and men
who wish to survive at work must adapt to the hegemonic masculinity practiced at the
workplace.”).
227 Yoshino, supra note 26, at 774-75 (“When discriminatory animus against an
identity is particularly strong, it may require conversion.”).
228 See id. at 774.
229 See id. at 774-75.
230 Because revelation of the participants’ identities would harm their careers, they
have requested to remain anonymous.
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same opportunity, the venture capitalists would be significantly more
likely to provide the funding she needed to grow the business.231 Her
comments revealed a firm conviction that discriminatory animus
against her sex made raising capital more difficult.
For the purpose of evading discriminatory biases, she strategically
converted the startup from an all-female-led firm to a mixed gender
firm. She brought a man into the venture to facilitate capital
acquisition, allowing the firm to present a masculine identity when
pitching investors. Conversion in this context differed from others
because the founder converted the identity of the startup instead of
her own. By offering contingent equity to a man and putting a
masculine identity in front of venture capitalists, she converted the
identity of the startup in a meaningful sense.
But there are limits to this form of conversion. The founder
described a desire to inhabit a male body as an avatar for purposes of
interacting with venture capitalists. She remarked that she wanted to
“use a bro like a puppet” and that it would be easier if she could “just
put [her] hand up his ass to move his mouth.”
The use of a man as a venture beard resulted in some disjunction.
On the substance, he lacked her mastery. He also lacked her drive and
passion for the product. She could not control his presentation as she
could her own. After he completed a number of unsuccessful pitches,
she ultimately abandoned the strategy and fired him.
It may be impossible to know whether this incident represents an
isolated case or a more widespread phenomenon. Although predicted
by identity performance theory, the female entrepreneurs pursuing
these conversion strategies (and the often bearded men in their
employ) have little incentive to reveal themselves publicly.
2.

Manclusion

Venture bearding also occurs when women elevate men from the
background to the foreground to derive economic and social benefits
from their male privilege. To describe the dynamic, we coin the term
manclusion. Manclusion occurs when women elevate and include men
in economic activities because the presence of the man causes other
men to moderate their behavior and improves outcomes.232
231 Research does support this belief. One study found that both survey
participants and experienced investors were more likely to fund ventures pitched by
men. See Brooks et al., Investors Prefer, supra note 145, at 4429.
232 See Tariyal, supra note 25 (“In one of my first meetings, a male investor avoided
eye contact with me and addressed his questions to my male co-founder. My co-
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As a strategy, manclusion represents a different form of venture
bearding than substitution. With manclusion, the woman does not
abdicate her official position as the leader of an entity — she simply
elevates and includes a man in economic and social interactions.
Consider the difficulties faced by Janica Alvarez, the CEO of startup
Naya Health Inc., a company offering a popular line of smart breast
pumps.233 When she went to pitch investors on her own, they would
ask her “how a mother of three stays in such good shape” or how she
could manage the company and her kids at the same time.234 In one
meeting, “investors Googled the product and ended up on a porn site.
They lingered on the page and started cracking jokes” about the
pornography.235
To keep investor meetings on track, Alvarez adopted a manclusion
strategy — she started “bringing her husband with her to pitch
meetings.”236 Once she inserted his masculine identity into the room,
“investors never made disparaging comments or asked about the
challenges of running a company as a parent.”237 Her husband, a
medical device engineer, said that without him investors treated “her
like a little girl trying to play a man’s game.”238
Manclusion — the inclusion of a man to induce better behavior from
other men — grants women access to a borrowed degree of male
privilege. This venture bearding strategy works because our culture
habituates men to extend respect to other men. Men may hesitate
before showing disrespect to a woman associated with another man
because they may see the woman as that man’s property. Because of
the fear introduced by the presence of a potential enforcer, other men
moderate their behavior.
Manclusion appears particularly distinctive because it is a unique
strategy for women in male-dominated environments. Men entering
female-dominated environments do not become imbued with a similar
social cachet by pulling women of lower rank in their business
hierarchy into meetings with outsiders.

founder, without pause, would politely turn to me and repeat the question verbatim.
This went on for multiple rounds as if we were caught in some surreal reenactment of
an ‘Abbott and Costello’ skit.”).
233 See Chang & Huet, A Smart Breast Pump, supra note 174.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. (quoting Jeffrey Alvarez).
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Implementation of the strategy does not always require physical
interactions. Manclusion may also operate effectively through email
communications. It happens when women copy men from their
organization on email exchanges so that their digital presence will
induce better behavior from their outside correspondents.
Manclusion remains problematic for a variety of reasons. It bestows
economic benefits, access, and inclusion upon men simply because of
their existing male privilege. By definition, manclusion occurs only
when the masculine identity is useful for mitigating gender bias from
other men. It also fails to directly challenge other men on their
behavior, leaving misogynistic norms in place. Manclusion also
contributes to skewed gender ratios by ensuring the
overrepresentation of men in leadership roles.
3.

Digital Passing

Electronic communication now allows some female entrepreneurs to
pass for male in a limited subset of interactions. Notably, Penelope
Gazin and Kate Dwyer digitally passed as a fictitious male cofounder
named “Keith Mann” when interacting with outside developers.239 By
electronically donning Mr. Mann’s masculine identity, Gazin and
Dwyer gained access to privilege that they would not have been able to
access under their own names.240
Other accounts show that presenting masculine identities in online
interactions allows women to pass for men and evade discriminatory
bias. For example, one man realized that “women do not get the same
respect in the workplace” after inadvertently switching email
signatures with a female colleague.241 He reported that his female
colleague had “the most productive week of her career” because she
did not need to “convince clients to respect her.”242
Female founders have been urged to pass in other ways. One
venture capitalist published a controversial op-ed in the Wall Street
Journal putting the onus on women to conform to a genderless
default, to pass and cover their identities online.243 He argued that
239

See Titlow, supra note 3.
See id.
241 See Zlata Rodionova, Gender Inequality: What Happened When a Man and Woman
Switched Names at Work For a Week, INDEP. (Mar. 10, 2017, 11:35 AM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/gender-inequality-man-womanswitch-names-week-martin-schneider-nicky-knacks-pay-gap-a7622201.html.
242 Id.
243 See John Greathouse, Why Women in Tech Might Consider Just Using Their Initials
Online, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2016/
240
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adopting a “gender-neutral persona allows women to access
opportunities that might otherwise be closed to them.”244 His advice
may be viewed as recommending passing to “make an initial
connection with a potential employer or investor.”245 After a wave of
criticism,246 he apologized for the “dreadful article.”247 He recognized
that his advice “told women to endure the gender bias problem rather
than acting to fix the problem.”248
Freada Kapor, a technology investor and diversity advocate, pointed
out the limited utility of the advice and rather obvious “holes in this
strategy.”249 She explained that if women adopted the strategy while
men continued to use their names, the use of initials would create an
obvious marker of difference.250 The strategy also does little for
persons with last names that suggest racial difference.251
Ultimately, these digital passing strategies offer only limited utility
in real world interactions. They may be more likely to backfire than to
generate any positive result. Like other venture bearding strategies,
digital passing decreases women’s visibility and reinforces perceptions
that the business world belongs to men.252

09/28/why-women-in-tech-might-consider-just-using-their-initials-online/ (“[W]omen in
today’s tech world should create an online presence that obscures their gender.”).
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 See, e.g., Ruth Graham, Male Entrepreneur Advises Women to Disguise Their
Gender If They Want Success, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2016. 4:55 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/xx_factor/2016/09/29/male_entrepreneur_john_greathouse_advises_women_to_
disguise_their_lady_names.html (“But Greathouse isn’t advising women to act with
professional decorum. He’s advising them to act like faceless, nameless cyphers,
thereby tricking people into assuming they’re men.”).
247 John Greathouse (@johngreathouse), TWITTER (Sept. 29, 2016, 1:01 PM),
https://twitter.com/johngreathouse/status/781584645691289600.
248 Id.
249 See Cale Guthrie Weissman, Female Execs to Contrite VC: Thanks but the Damage
(Continues to Be) Done, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.
com/3064258/female-executives-the-op-ed-telling-them-to-hide-their-gender (quoting
Freada Kapor).
250 See id.
251 See id.
252 Cf. Joan W. Howarth, Executing White Masculinities: Learning from Karla Faye
Tucker, 81 OR. L. REV. 183, 217 (2002) (“[O]ften the first things we see about the
person is whether a person is male and recognizably and appropriately masculine, or
female . . . . We do not have the capacity to ignore sex and gender . . . unless it is
rendered invisible because it is so ordinary.”).
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Covering Continues

Discriminatory animus in startups, technology companies, and
venture capital firms now places extraordinary pressure on women to
both cover and reverse cover at the same time.253 The pressure to
cover demands that women deflect attention from their difference
while the simultaneous pressure to reverse cover encourages them to
conform to expectations about behavior for women.254 Kenji Yoshino
explained that these demands mean that for women to succeed they
must “have the correctly titrated balance of masculine and feminine
traits. One must be ‘authoritative’ and ‘formidable,’ but remain an
‘appealing lady.’”255
Demands to reverse cover may apply with less force to women who
self-identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer. In
particular, gender-fluid white and Asian women may enjoy greater
success with covering strategies than women with more contextually
stigmatized identities.256 One study detailed how these women
experienced greater inclusion by presenting in ways that minimized
their femininity.257 One white, bisexual woman used a “gender-neutral
style [that] positioned her as an ‘insider’ within a male-dominated
team and company.”258 This presentation insulated her “from the
microaggressions and gender-based discrimination that women who
were conventionally feminine reported.”259 Other gender-fluid women
achieved “acceptance, in part, by cultivating a style of communication
and dress that made them virtually indistinguishable from their male
peers.”260
253 For a broader description of covering and reverse covering, see text
accompanying notes 206–19. For an intersectional analysis, see Gowri Ramachandran,
Intersectionality As “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither
Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALA. L. REV. 299, 300 (2006) (arguing that “negotiating
multiple identity performance demands simultaneously often places intersectionals in
a uniquely restricted situation”).
254 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 910.
255 Id.
256 See Lauren Alfrey & France Winddance Twine, Gender-Fluid Geek Girls:
Negotiating Inequality Regimes in the Tech Industry, 31 GENDER & SOC’Y 28, 28 (2016).
257 See id.
258 Id. at 40.
259 Id.
260 Id. But see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-52 (1989) (finding
that the partnership discriminated against Ann Hopkins because she failed to conform
to feminine gender stereotypes and was too aggressive in her treatment of staff and
holding that it is illegal under Title VII to discriminate against a woman for her failure
to live up to stereotypes of how a woman should act).
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Yet in many instances, these identity performance demands to cover
and reverse cover may now create insurmountable barriers. Ellen Pao’s
autobiographical account of her experience as a venture capitalist
reads as an extended case study in covering.261 It captures how
inconsistent demands to both minimize gender difference and perform
a feminine identity place women in a catch-22. She describes the
contradictory demands to both downplay her difference from the
masculine norm and the maddening criticisms she faced for failing to
conform to expectations about her identity:
We are either silenced or we are seen as buzzkills. We are
either left out of the social network that leads to power — the
strip clubs and the steak dinners and the all-male ski trips —
and so we don’t fit in, or our presence leads to changes in the
way things are done, and that causes anger, which means we
still don’t fit in. If you talk, you talk too much. If you don’t
talk, you’re too quiet. You don’t own the room. If you want to
protect your work, you’re not a team player. Your elbows are
too sharp. You’re too aggressive. If you don’t protect your
work, you should be leaning in. If you don’t negotiate, you’re
underpaid. If you do negotiate, you’re complaining. If you
want a promotion, you’re overreaching. If you don’t ask for a
promotion, you get assigned all the unwanted tasks.262
The continuing pressure for outgroup entrepreneurs to both cover
and reverse affects their ability to access capital and other economic
benefits.
III. LEGAL AND PRIVATE ORDERING RESPONSES
Venture bearding does not always allow founders to overcome bias
and access capital. Even when it does, it still requires many founders
to pay a relatively higher cost to access capital than founders with
favored identities. If anything, venture bearding practices may reinforce
discriminatory norms and increase the overall cost of capital for
persons without idealized identities. This Part argues that because of
the limited reach of anti-discrimination laws, stakeholders should
consider options to promote equality and enhance economic growth.

261
262

PAO, RESET supra note 2, at 143.
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A. The Limited Reach of Anti-Discrimination Law
Traditional anti-discrimination law interventions may not succeed at
reshaping the business environment.263 The most basic reason for this
failure is that Title VII law applies only to employers in an
employment relationship with employees. Thus, a founder attempting
to find investors will not have this relationship with those from whom
she seeks investment. Moreover, even if there is an employeremployee relationship, Title VII often requires an employee to prove
that she has been treated discriminatorily based on her sex by
comparing her treatment with others who are not members of her
protected class. If there is open and obvious discrimination against a
woman as a woman, this requirement of proving a comparator is not
necessary, but if the discriminatory treatment is subtle, most courts
like to see a comparator who has been treated differently. Moreover, as
in Ellen Pao’s case, once a victim gets to the jury, proving
discriminatory motive is not easy — the jury concluded that despite
the terrible treatment she endured which seemed to result from her
sex that she had not proved that she was a victim of sex
discrimination. This result seems to be due to her failure to convince
the jury that she was not an aggressive “bitch,” a stereotype in itself,
who deserved what she got. Finally, although there are causes of
action under Title VII that redress both intentional and nonintentional systemic discrimination, Title VII emphasizes individual
bad actors who reach discriminatory results against other individuals,
rather than systemic discrimination, and the Court has made it
exceedingly difficult to prove systemic cases.264
B. Private Law and Market Responses
A close focus on venture capitalists and entrepreneurs risks missing
other critical, and often passive, silent, stakeholders.265 Venture capital
263 See Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 55, 58 (2009) (“Antidiscrimination work seeks to punish and prevent
discriminatory conduct, rather than shift underlying inequities in favor of broader
balance. These efforts fail to rectify gender-based power disparities.”).
264 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (discussing both
systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact cases under Title VII and in dicta
limiting those causes of action).
265 See Christopher Gulinello, Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and
Passive Investors, 70 ALB. L. REV. 303, 303 (2006) (“The current orthodox view is that
investors in U.S. venture capital funds are passive. They delegate decision-making
authority and other management responsibilities to the fund manager. Legal
scholarship on the U.S. venture capital market, however, has offered surprisingly little
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firms serve as intermediaries between institutional investors and
entrepreneurs.266 Because institutional investors provide venture
capital firms with much of the capital venture capitalists use to strike
deals with entrepreneurs, institutional investors enjoy some leverage
to address bias in the capital allocation process.
Notably, the investors providing capital to venture capital funds
have substantially different rights than the shareholders of publicly
traded corporations. Because institutional investors possess limited
rights under current agreements, institutional investors may seek to
negotiate for governance covenants in future agreements.
1.

Limited Options for Fiduciary Suits Under Existing Agreements

Venture capital firms generally owe specific contractual and
fiduciary duties to their investors.267 Most courts and theorists
recognize that default fiduciary duties include duties of care, loyalty,
and good faith.268 In theory, institutional investors might consider
suits against venture capitalists for breaches of these fiduciary duties if
misconduct by venture capitalists causes damage to the venture capital
fund.
In practice, however, suits against venture capital funds for breaches
of fiduciary duty may be extraordinarily difficult. Most venture capital
firms organize their funds as limited partnerships under Delaware
law.269 Delaware allows “drafters of Delaware limited partnerships to
modify or eliminate fiduciary-based principles of governance, and

analysis on why venture capital fund investors are passive.”).
266 See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003) (“The typical transactional
pattern in the U.S. venture capital market is for institutional investors — pension
funds, banks, insurance companies, and endowments and foundations — to invest
through intermediaries, venture capital limited partnerships usually called ‘venture
capital funds,’ in which the investors are passive limited partners.”).
267 Charles M. Yablon, Innovation, the State and Private Enterprise: A Corporate
Lawyer’s Perspective Reviewing the Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private
Sector Myths, by Mariana Mazzucato (Anthem Press Rev. Ed. 2014), 40 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1017, 1026 (2016) (book review).
268 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)
(describing the fiduciary duty “triad” as including duties of “good faith, loyalty or due
care”).
269 See David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of
Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 370 (2002) (“Although systematic data are
not yet available, evidence suggests that venture capital contracts are routinely
organized under Delaware law . . . .”).

1920

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:1873

displace them with contractual terms.”270 Venture capital firms take
full advantage of this freedom and typically create limited partnership
agreements that waive default fiduciary duties.271
Without the protection of fiduciary duties, investors may struggle to
use lawsuits to hold venture capitalists accountable for their
misbehavior. If a limited partnership agreement waives duties of care
and loyalty, an investor is unlikely to win a suit alleging that venture
capitalists breached nonexistent duties. Given the limited options
available to institutional investors under existing agreements,
institutional investors must exert influence through other channels.
Initial and reinvestment periods provide institutional investors with
significant bargaining leverage.272 Most venture capital funds exist for
approximate ten-year terms.273 During this window of time,
institutional investors may bargain for additional contractual
covenants or fiduciary duties, giving them influence over future
funding cycles. Institutional investors may focus their efforts at
securing specific covenants from venture capital firms to advance
equality and ensure that the venture capital fund invests in a genderdiverse portfolio.
2.

A Private Ordering Mechanism: Governance Covenants

Governance covenants may provide a mechanism for private law to
address invidious discrimination in the venture capital space.274
Institutional investors expect venture capitalists to add value to earlystage companies beyond simply providing a mechanism to transfer
270 Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, 155 A.3d 358, 366 (Del. 2017) (describing
“settled principles of law governing Delaware limited partnerships”).
271 See Rosenberg, supra note 269, at 382 (“[T]he limited partnership agreement
usually includes a waiver of all default duties under the applicable law of limited
partnerships (usually Delaware).”).
272 See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV.
315, 345 (2005) (“Exit is not merely optional for venture capitalists. Most venture
capital funds have a fixed life, usually ten years with an option to extend for a period
up to three years. Any venture capitalist who desires to remain in business, therefore,
must successfully raise funds, invest them in portfolio companies, then exit the
companies and return the proceeds to the fund investors, who in turn are expected to
reinvest in a new fund formed by the same venture capitalist (assuming that the
previous investment was successful).”).
273 See id.
274 We use the term “governance covenant” to denote an agreement for a venture
capital firm to meet particularized governance standards itself or to invest only in
firms that implement particularized governance mechanisms, such as the creation of a
human resources department or the acceptance of codes of conduct.
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large sums of institutional capital to early-stage businesses.275 Both
entrepreneurs and institutional investors prize venture capitalists who
increase startup success rates by bringing their business knowledge
and connections to bear.276 In theory, this should result in improved
governance and decision-making by companies with venture capital
investment.
Institutional investors may now need to more actively focus on
governance issues because venture capital firms have failed to mitigate
governance risks. Recent, public, and value-destroying governance
failures at venture-backed firms provide ample cause for institutional
investors to pressure venture capital firms to improve governance and
workplace cultures at their portfolio companies.277 Institutional
investors may also need to focus on governance provisions because
many venture-backed firms remain private for longer periods and no
longer implement standard governance reforms to prepare for an
initial public offering.278
Even if institutional investors seek and obtain governance
covenants, their efforts will only partially address the pervasive and
systemic stigmas driving entrepreneurs to engage in venture bearding
practices. Institutional investors have strong incentives to push for
governance practices and policies that reduce material risks to their
investments. To the extent that invidious bias persists in the capital
formation space, entrepreneurs will still face pressure to perform their
identities in ways calculated to increase access to capital.
3.

Market Forces

Private market forces may also address bias-driven funding
disparities. If current funding disparities are economically irrational,
investors may achieve abnormally profitable returns by targeting
investments toward founders with stigmatized identities.279 Some
275

See Rosenberg, supra note 269, at 363-64.
Cf. Jay B. Kesten & Murat C. Mungan, Political Uncertainty and the Market for
IPOs, 41 J. CORP. L. 431, 436 (2015) (“VCs provide at least three non-financial
benefits: managerial assistance, reputational capital, and intensive monitoring.”).
277 Consider, for example, the sexual harassment scandals at Uber and Sofi. See
supra Part I.A.3.
278 See Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
165, 167 (2017) (“[T]here has been little academic discussion of the unique
governance challenges posed by an increasing number of Unicorns without
discernable plans to pursue the traditional exit strategy for a successful startup — an
initial public offering (IPO).”).
279 See Louis Anthony Steiner, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Critical
276
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funds have already embraced this theory and begun to direct capital
toward founders with stigmatized identities.280 Consider Backstage
Capital for an example.281 Its founder, Arlan Hamilton, calls for
funders to recognize how current bias creates an economic
opportunity to invest at undervalued prices.282 Other venture
capitalists have also embraced this thesis.283 These early bets may pay
significant returns and a single, salient success may cause other funds
to adopt similar strategies.
Some evidence now indicates that gender diversity improves
financial performance at venture capital firms. One recent review
found that “[d]iversity significantly improves financial performance
on measures such as profitable investments at the individual portfoliocompany level and overall fund returns.”284 Researchers also found
significant benefits for gender diversity, finding that venture capital
“firms that increased their proportion of female partner hires by 10%
saw, on average, a 1.5% spike in overall fund returns each year and
had 9.7% more profitable exits (an impressive figure given that only
28.8% of all VC investments have a profitable exit).”285 These figures

Examination of Regulation A+ and Its Rationales, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 155,
180 (2017) (“If this disparity in funding stems not from economically rational factors
but rather from biases against women and minorities, we might expect market forces
to remedy the problem, since those spurned businesses represent untapped
opportunities and potential above-market returns.”).
280 See id. (“[S]everal venture capital funds targeting female-founded companies
have cropped up in recent years . . . .”).
281 See generally Clare O’Connor, Inside Backstage Capital, the VC Betting on (Almost
All) Black, LGBT, Hispanic, and Women Founders, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2017, 1:08 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2017/08/01/inside-backstage-capital-thevc-betting-on-almost-all-black-lgbt-hispanic-and-women-founders/#230fc96e3833
(“In a sector where black women receive only 0.2% of all funding, Backstage Capital
overwhelmingly — and intentionally — backs underrepresented founders.”).
282 See Arlan Hamilton, Dear White Venture Capitalists: If You’re Reading This, It’s
(Almost!) Too Late, MEDIUM (June 13, 2015), https://medium.com/femalefounders/dear-white-venture-capitalists-if-you-re-not-actively-searching-for-andseeding-qualified-4f382f6fd4a7 (“Because of the blind spot investors have for this
group of people right now, there’s an enormous opportunity to invest at undervalued
prices. It won’t always be this way. Adjust your thinking NOW. Adapt NOW.”).
283 See, e.g., ROSS BAIRD, THE INNOVATION BLIND SPOT: WHY WE BACK THE WRONG
IDEAS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 28 (2017) (“Blind spots cause investors to miss not
only companies but also entire markets of people. Too many investors stick to a
narrow range of ideas shaped by their own echo chamber . . . .”).
284 Paul Gompers & Silpa Kovvali, The Other Diversity Dividend, HARV. BUS. REV.
(July 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/the-other-diversity-dividend.
285 Id.
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strongly suggest that capital allocators may achieve outperformance by
shifting additional capital to more diverse venture capital firms.
C. Public Intervention
Given the importance of venture capital processes to interstate
commerce, a future Congress might also intervene and mandate
gender equality on the governing boards of venture capital firms with
assets above particular amounts.286 Mandating gender parity might
significantly reduce the need for entrepreneurs to engage in venture
bearding behaviors to secure access to capital. It might also improve
risk management by venture capital firms.287 Congress might conclude
that this type of public intervention would lower the cost of capital for
approximately half of the population and significantly increase rates of
economic growth.288
Public intervention might also be justified because the current
market equilibrium that extracts venture bearding behavior from
entrepreneurs also limits the ability of the private market to shift its
norms. When women use venture bearding strategies to access capital,
their presence within the market remains masked. Because women
lack visibility in the space, the norms that require women to project
idealized masculinized identities persist.
If the United States took a public intervention approach, it would
not be the first nation to mandate some form of gender parity in
corporate governance. For example, Norway implemented reforms in
2003 to require greater representation for women on corporate

286 At least one scholar has pointed out that disparities in venture capital processes
might be addressed by the commerce power. See, e.g., Linda R. Crane, From Gibbons to
Lopez: Does the Commerce Clause Remain a Viable Tool for Eliminating the Vestiges of
Slavery?, 4 BARRY L. REV. 71, 89 (2003) (“We’re talking about . . . the lower rate at
which Black-Americans have access to venture capital for starting businesses . . . all of
which are clearly directly related to interstate commerce . . . .”).
287 See Kristin N. Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve
Financial Firms’ Risk Oversight?, 70 SMU L. REV. 327, 376 (2017) (“Studies reveal that
heterogeneous groups may have greater success overcoming herd behavior,
groupthink, and relational biases that impact senior executives and boards of
directors’ risk management decisions.”).
288 Moreover, increasing the number of women on the boards may help to eliminate
sexual harassment that has become the focus of the #MeToo movement. See Nicole Raz,
Las Vegas Gaming Company Boards Below Average in Women Members, LAS VEGAS REV. J.
(Feb. 13, 2018, 7:56 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/casinos-gaming/lasvegas-gaming-company-boards-below-average-in-women-members/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2018).
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boards.289 The Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality explained
the legislation’s importance, pointing out that it would “secure
women’s influence in decision making processes of great importance
for the economy in the society,” and that it “is important to make use
of all the human resources in our country, not just half of it.”290
Other nations have followed Norway’s example and taken steps to
address gender disparities in corporate governance. France acted in
2011 to require that each gender comprise at least forty percent of
public company boards.291 Germany soon followed.292
CONCLUSION
Widespread bias and stigmatization in the venture capital, startup,
and technology sectors now cause many founders to adopt ingenious
venture bearding strategies. Although these strategies now facilitate
access to capital, their use both testifies to widespread bias and risks
reinforcing discriminatory norms.
Importantly, the environment giving rise to venture bearding
strategies imposes costs on society as well as founders. A high cost of
capital for founders with stigmatized identities means that the
entrepreneurs best situated to serve vast markets may struggle to
access capital and many social welfare enhancing technologies may go
undeveloped or face significant headwinds.293 These results lead not
only to undeveloped resources but also to the promotion of
inequalities of non-favored groups, the very persons who have
historically suffered from invidious discrimination. Individual female
289

See Rosenblum, supra note 263, at 62-63 (describing Norway’s reforms).
Id. at 66.
291 See Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More than a Woman: Insights into
Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 889 (2015) (“In
early 2011, France adopted a law that requires men and women each have at least
forty percent representation on corporate boards.”).
292 See id. at 890.
293 See, e.g., Tariyal, supra note 25.
290

In my own case, the technology I am developing — a “smart” tampon that
tests the endometrial cells shed in menstrual fluid for disease — only
complicates matters, partly because our potential funders are unaccustomed
to talking about menstruation. Some of my mentors recommended I mask
the technology itself: Strip the deck of “menstrual blood” and call it a novel
female substrate, they suggested. Don’t say you’re a “women’s health” company.
It signals a lack of scientific heft. I understood them to mean: Try to look as
little as possible like what you really are — a woman-led company utilizing
female biology to advance health care for half the population.
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founders should not be left with the choice of venture bearding or
losing capital. The markets combined with legal regulation should
redress the vast inequities.

